Price Discrimination and the Regulation of Air Transportation by Silberman, Alan H.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 31 | Issue 3 Article 3
1965
Price Discrimination and the Regulation of Air
Transportation
Alan H. Silberman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan H. Silberman, Price Discrimination and the Regulation of Air Transportation, 31 J. Air L. & Com. 198 (1965)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol31/iss3/3
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE REGULATION OF
AIR TRANSPORTATION
By ALAN H. SILBERMANt
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION-SOME THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
A. The Emerging Focal Role Of Price Regulation
B. The Full Dimension Of Price Regulation
1. The Uses of a Single-Entity or Homogeneous Approach
2. The Elements of a "Multi-Dimensional" Approach
II. HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AIRLINE PRICE REGULATION
A. Transportation Price Discrimination: Its Historical Context
1. The Statutory Roots of the Rule Against Price Discrimination
2. The Historical Meaning of "Non-Discriminatory" Rates
3. The Shift from Consumer Protection to "Competitive" Balance
4. The Distinctive Position of the Airline Industry
B. The Relation Of Economics To Rate Regulation
1. The Role of Social and Political Considerations
2. The Significant Economic Factors in Air Transport
C. The Responsibility For The Application Of Economic Theory
III. THE Ad Hoc APPROACH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Introduction-The Basis For The CAB's Managerial Philosophy
B. Early Pricing Practices In Air Transportation
1. Premium and Discount Pricing
2. The Air Travel Plan
3. The Treatment of Rate Relationships
C. Administrative Regulation And The Egalitarian Ethic
1. The Avoidance of Product or Market Definitions
2. The Use of Different Standards in Competitive and Non-Com-
petitive Cases
a. The Treatment of Surface Carrier Competition
b. Balancing "Competition" Between CAB-Regulated Carriers
c. Meeting the Competition of Unregulated Air Carriers
3. The Tendency Toward Cost-Increasing Forms of Competition
4. The Absence of a De Minimis Approach to Discrimination
D. Specific Problems of Pricing Technique
1. The Problem of Identity Fares
t B.A. in Political Science, Northwestern University; LL.B., Yale University; presently Law
Clerk to Judge Hubert L. Will, United States District Court, Chicago, Illinois.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
2. The Use of "Tour Basing" Fares and Similar Excursion Re-
quirements
3. The Assumptions of Family-Plan Fares
IV. CONCLUSION-AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS UNDER A MODIFIED
REGULATORY SCHEME
A. The Findings Suggested By This Study
B. Some Perceptible Changes In CAB Attitudes: The Approval Of
Non-Emulative Responses To Inter-Carrier Competition
C. Increasing Managerial Alternatives In Operating Authority: An
Area For Future Investigation
I. INTRODUCTION-SoME THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
A. The Emerging Focal Role Of Price Regulation
A S THE domestic air transport industry continues to mature, questions
of inter-carrier competition and allowable latitudes in pricing experi-
mentation have begun to emerge as matters of singular importance. In
this respect, commercial aviation is no different than any other new in-
dustry with high developmental costs. During a period of rapid tech-
nological change and major expansion of production facilities, pricing,
and price competition in particular, have but limited significance. How-
ever, as the pace of technological innovation slows and the producers'
market areas stabilize, the industry enters a new phase in which pricing
practices may be expected to become the major competitive tool. Recent
developments suggest that the domestic trunkline carriers have entered
such a phase.
With the application of turbine power to medium and short-range air-
craft, the rapid pace of technological development which characterized
the first two postwar decades has slowed measurably. Aircraft now being
phased into service or just entering the production stage, such as the
BAC-111, DC-9, Boeing 737 and the like, are no longer surrounded by
the mystique of new aerodynamic frontiers, nor do they partake of the
earlier "romance of air transportation" in which any acquisition was
viewed as a sign of progress and growth. The decisions to purchase such
aircraft and the operational use to which they are put are today essentially
market-oriented decisions in which the carrier's ability to stimulate de-
mand and achieve the most efficient use of its resources and maximize
revenue, become determining factors. Any estimate of this ability must
necessarily rest on the carrier's evaluation of the latitude it has in pricing
and packaging its product. While this transformation is not fully corn-
I Regulatory policy may be an incentive for increased investment in one of two ways, by pre-
serving artificial fare levels or by assisting in the generation of new consumer demand. The recent
announcement of substantial new jet aircraft purchases by the major trunkline carriers, points up
the conflict which may arise. On the one hand, the aircraft ordered must be paid for, encouraging
a "gentlemen's agreement" tacitly supported by the CAB, designed to protect or increase present
rate-of-return levels. On the other hand, the added seat-miles produced by the new aircraft must
be sold to consumers. While demand for air transportation continues to rise, the potential new con-
sumers are both more cost conscious and also less frequent travelers. The possibility that these fac-
tors may run at cross-purposes is obvious,
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plete, as anyone following the reactions to the construction of a super-
sonic transport (SST) may testify, the supersonic age is sufficiently remote
and dependent on a number of serious questions of economic practicality
yet unresolved, that its current effect on the industry is hardly more
than negligible.
Other indices support the hypothesis that domestic air transportation
has entered a new phase. With the exception of the route awards which
may possibly be made in the Pacific Northwest-Southwest Case recently
instituted,' the era of major trunkline route expansion is over. Moreover,
the possibility of new entrants in the trunkline field is highly remote.
The control of entry may remain as an interesting academic question,
but it cannot be considered as a practical regulatory problem.
These factors combine to make pricing practices the primary focus of
carrier competition (and of possible anti-competitive activity as well).
While the industry has experienced similar conditions before on a short-
term basis, principally in the late forties and again at the beginning of
the jet age, the current phase may be expected to be of substantially longer
duration. Accordingly, it must be looked upon not merely as a "transi-
tional" period, but as a continuing condition calling for a thorough exami-
nation, by the industry and the Civil Aeronautics Board, of the regulatory
philosophy which has emerged from the numerous ad hoc considerations
of carrier pricing proposals.
B. The Full Dimension Of Price Regulation
The probability of increased emphasis on pricing as a potential com-
petitive response poses substantial problems in any industry. For a regu-
lated industry, the problems are heightened. The range of possible responses
to competition is narrowed by the fact of agency control. For an agency
charged with charting a course in the grey area between complete regula-
tion and full-blown competition, the attendant shift in focus from general
competitive rates-of-return and appropriate fare levels to specific com-
petitive rates is a severe test of its institutional capabilities. So long as the
primary concern is limited to finding an average rate-of-return which
would approximate a competitive model,4 the industry may be properly
2CAB Docket No. 15459, CAB Order No. E-21186 (13 Aug. 1964) (instituting proceeding).
a See Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators 86-91 (Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. CXX,
1962) [hereinafter cited as Caves]. Caves' study is a highly successful integration of factual ma-
terial and economic analysis covering all aspects of the industry and the CAB. Its assistance in the
preparation of this essay is gratefully acknowledged. While entry into the trunkline field is re-
stricted by the sheer height of the economic barriers, entry does remain an open question with regard
to so-called "third-level air carriers," see, e.g., C. E. Waits, d/b/a Hi-Plains Airways, CAB Docket
No. 12258, CAB Order No. E-19343 (1 March 1963). Similar questions are also infrequently posed
by applications for exemption from air taxi takeoff weight restrictions, e.g., Aspen Airways, Inc.,
CAB Docket No. 13159, CAB Order No. E-21761 (4 Feb. 1965), and special services in particular
markets for limited periods of time, e.g., Vance Roberts, d/b/a Vance International Airways, CAB
Docket No. 15802, CAB Order No. E-21766 (5 Feb. 1965) granting exemption to operate in-
dividually-ticketed service with one 99-seat DC-7 aircraft between San Francisco and Los Angeles
on the one hand, and Twin Falls, Idaho, on the other, on weekends between 6 Feb. 1965 and 7
March 1965.
' The rate-of-return which would "approximate a competitive model" should not be confused
with a competitive rate-of-return. The "model" is simply an analytical tool which allows profit
to be evaluated against a standard of average efficiency so that a higher-than-specified rate-of-return




viewed as a single entity or, as the subject under consideration requires,
as a small number of homogeneous groupings. However, such an approach
is of little value when the agency is called upon to deal with inter-carrier
competition and must focus on different carriers' attempts to use their
resources in alternative methods and often in less than all of the markets
they serve. Moreover, as we shall note below, the dimensions of price
regulation must be extended to comprehend alternative responses to
competition which do not involve modifications of the tariff structure
but rest on attempts to achieve lower costs or capture new sources of
revenue by making operating changes. In such instances, the competitive
potential of the industry can only be maximized through the use of a
"multi-dimensional" approach in which significant differences in efficiency,
equipment and route structure between carriers can be recognized and
incorporated in the decision-making process.
1. The Uses of a Single-Entity or Homogeneous Approach
Within a regulated pricing structure, price regulation decisions take
two forms. First, what is the appropriate rate of return for the carrier,
carrier-group or industry? Second, how will this return be obtained?
Under a system which guarantees each enterprise a standard rate of return
without regard to its efficiency, the problem is none too difficult, so long
as the units do not purport to be competitive. To be sure, there will be
minor problems of allocating charges and perhaps interminable arguments
as to the propriety of various cost accounting methods. Still, a decision
need only consider what is "fair" to the consumer.
If, however, the industry is competitive, in whole or in part, a standard
rate of return for all units is inappropriate. Since it provides no incentive
for efficiency, a standard rate would tend to increase costs. So long as the
units are the proponents of rate proposals,' there is little compulsion
toward rational pricing.7 Where units of varying efficiency are competing
with different enterprises in different markets and have noncompetitive
rights in others, any determination of appropriate price levels in each
market presents insurmountable problems. Under such a system, an
attempt to gauge costs on a market-by-market basis or carrier-by-carrier
basis would yield no guides. Indeed, it would seem to complicate matters
even more. The Civil Aeronautics Board has wisely eschewed suggestions
that they involve themselves directly in this morass,' although, as will
appear later, their rationale is open to questioning. When direct subsidy
is also present, decisions as to price level may appear somewhat easier,
assuming a bias toward obtaining the highest possible profit and a view
s Obviously, the interests of the enterprise demand that long and detailed arguments be made
concerning what should be included in the rate base. These problems, however significant, are com-
mon to all rate-of-return inquiries and, on the whole, appear to rest on long-standing administrative
practice and general, if grudging, industry acceptance.
' The CAB, like the ICC, is empowered to make rates. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §
1002(d), 72 Stat. 788 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1964), set out in note 24 infra. However,
chief rate-making responsibility rests with the carriers and direct CAB rate-making is a rare
occurrence.
See Local-Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 416 (1961).
... s See Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United Stales Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey and Analysis-II, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 148, 161 (1958).
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that competition is no more than a device for ensuring adequate service
in the market. Here too, the regulatory body must consider what portion
of increased (or decreased) profits is to be borne by subsidy, by the
enterprise or by consumers in various markets."
The Civil Aeronautics Board, charged by statute to promote "competi-
tion to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air
transportation system ...,,,1. has grappled with the problem in dealing,
albeit infrequently, with problems of return on investment and the over-
all fare level:"
[T]o use the most poorly situated carrier as the unit of ratemaking would
result in the vast majority of the public paying rates greatly in excess of the
cost . . . and would unjustly enrich the great majority of the air carriers.
By the same token, we obviously cannot fix fare levels on the basis of the
need of the most favorably situated carrier."
The Board's solution has been to describe a desirable range for return on
investment based on hypothetical costs for homogeneous carrier-groups."a
9 See text accompanying note 129 infra for an example of this problem.
soFederal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(d), 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1964),
set out in note 24 infra.
" Despite a recent trend toward such proceedings, see, e.g., Rate of Return, Local-Service
Carriers Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 685 (1960); General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291
(1960); and Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, note 7 supra, such investigations may
nevertheless be termed "infrequent" when considered in relation to the numerous proceedings in-
vestigating specific fares. Moreover, between 1938 and the first case cited herein, there was only one
proceeding dealing with rate-of-return and general fare level questions. See text accompanying
notes 123-31 infra.
As this article is being prepared for publication, the CAB has embarked on a new set of pro-
ceedings involving questions of fare level and the level of payments for the carriage of mail. On
21 July 1965, the Board announced a proposed $4.95 million reduction in domestic service mail
rates, Domestic Service Mail Rate Case, CAB Docket No. 15726, CAB Order No. E-22461 (21
July 1965) (statement of provisional findings and conclusions and order to show cause), and, at
the same time, instituted a new investigation, Domestic Service Mail Rates, CAB Docket No. 16349,
CAB Order No. E-22462 (21 July 1965), to establish mail rates for the period following the ex-
piration of the newly-proposed rates. Previously, carriers had received mail pay on the basis of
rates established in 1955. American Airlines, Inc., Domestic Trunklines Service Mail Rates, 21
C.A.B. 8 (1955).
In addition, a new round of passenger tariff revisions proposed in connection with the modifica-
tion of free baggage allowances has stimulated concern with the general passenger fare level and,
more importantly, with the effect the carrier's healthy earnings position has on the development
of air transportation. See note 1 si pra. Thus, the Board severed the proposed tariff revisions from the
baggage revision, allowing the latter to go into effect and suspending the fifty-cent increase in first-
class fares which had been proposed along with it. Domestic Trunkline Carriers, CAB Docket No.
16363, CAB Order No. E-22483 (27 July 1965).
Perhaps even more significant is the fact that the Board, in the course of its order in Domestic
Trunkline Carriers, stressed the opportunities for carrier initiative in matters of specific pricing tech-
niques and operating authority which could be exercised within the agency-determined rate-of-return
framework:
There are a number of areas which the airlines could examine in order to bring addi-
tional service improvements to the public without compromising a healthy earnings
position. The following examples illustrate some of the improvements which the car-
riers may consider. As the short-range jets replace piston aircraft in many additional
markets, bringing the benefits of better service at lower unit costs, and as the volume
of traffic increases, the industry efforts should be directed toward developing low-
cost transportation services on these segments. The carriers could also improve the
adequacy of existing coach service by extending such service to more communities,
and by increasing, in certain instances, the number of coach seats in dual configuration
aircraft to reflect the relative demand for coach and first class service, provide better
service to small cities, and experiment with additional economy services to high traffic
density markets on a sound economic basis. Id. at 7-8.
12 General Passenger-Fare Investigation, supra note 11, at 330.
" E.g., the "Big Four," the "Medium Eight" (seven since the United-Capital merger), local
service carriers and all-cargo carriers.
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The hypothetical cost curve (or "class rate") becomes a standard against
which all carriers, despite individual variations in output, density or
route structure, can "compete" and be measured. 4 The analysis thus gives
the Board a standard upon which to gauge the overall fare level and a
means of ascribing profits falling outside the desirable range to highly
efficient or inefficient operations.
Such an approach is well suited to this aspect of the pricing problem.
However, since it encompasses only one-half of the price regulation
function, its reliance on efficiency and cost factors only serves to keep
a check on carriers' returns on investment.15
Competition against such an external standard is not actual competition.
The external standard is built on the hypothesis that all carriers are pro-
ducers of comparable units-seat-miles, passenger-miles, or ton-miles-
when in fact the carriers are multiple-product producers, using aircraft
to manufacture point-to-point transportation, which is then sold by
seat or ton-mile and may be packaged in various "containers." E.g., the
product may be sold non-stop or multi-stop; one-way, round-trip or
one of several variations in between; and the manufacturing tool (the
aircraft) may be operated so that different products may be produced
simultaneously. Accordingly, the "homogeneous" approach cannot be
applied when competition within the industry is in issue. It provides no
incentive for efficient allocation of resources and offers no guidelines for
evaluating specific fare proposals.
However, as this study hopes to demonstrate, the CAB has failed to
recognize this distinction and generally has dealt with specific fare pro-
posals on an industry-wide basis, i.e., as if all carriers were identically
situated. In the earlier phases of the industry's development, such errors
may have had little recognizable effect. However, as specific pricing prob-
lems of particular carriers become the central issue in air carrier competi-
tion and regulation, the Board's failure to approach these questions with
criteria which will promote efficient operations through reliance on com-
petitive norms becomes more significant. The incentive for efficiency pro-
vided by an approach based on the assumption of a homogeneous industry
14 A class rate structure, however, is prone to abuse by the CAB to the extent that it is used
to foster homogeneity within the industry by making decisions to encourage all carriers to conform
to the hypothetical cost curve, or to the extent that decisions are based on the result obtained
when the formula is used to determine subsidy levels rather than on the actual facts (e.g., a local
service carrier may be serving a point at a profit of $12,000, but deletion of the point will cause
the subsidy level determined by class rate formula to drop; reliance on the formula can thus result
in the deletion of profitable service in the name of subsidy reduction).
" That is not to say that the return on investment which the CAB allows is as low as it might
possibly be. On the one hand, allowable return is a function of the risk involved-the extent to
which regulatory policy results in a high guaranteed minimum return, route competition not-
withstanding. On the other hand, demands for sufficient return to cover the cost of new invest-
ment, supra note 1, push the allowable return up over what it would be if there was no notion of
a guaranteed minimum. The essential question is whether allowing a high rate-of-return is really
a function of necessary new investment or vice-versa, viz., that the extent of new investment is in
part controlled by the fact that it can be used to prevent a lowering of the allowable return. In
any case, controlling the return on investment factor does not involve any inquiry as to how the
desired return will be obtained, a problem which becomes even more significant if regulatory policy
t nd1 to encourage overinvestment.
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is sufficient for rate-of-return and similar questions."5 Its application to
specific pricing proposals is an illogical limitation on the industry's
potential efficient development. It is in this second aspect of the pricing
problem-the range of possible techniques which may be utilized to
gain an allowable return on investment-that the focus of this essay is
found.
2. The Elements of a "Multi-Dimensional" Approach
The ultimate question for future air transport regulation is the allo-
cation of the components of profit between the industry as a whole, the
individual carriers and consumers, the latter group being capable of divi-
sion along market lines (e.g., short-haul vs. long-haul, dense market vs.
thin market) or by type of travel (e.g., business; vacation; numerical
group; identity group; volume user, etc.) as well as being viewed as a
single entity. The term "components of profit" must include a wide
range of actual and potential factors. Among these are the entire range
of cost savings stemming from increased efficiency, more exact cost alloca-
tion, technological and market innovations and changes in service to con-
form to demand patterns. Also included is the simple fact of increasing
demand and the more complex problems of matching route structure and
density and stimulating demand in a manner which will promote efficient
use of resources.'"
The clearest example of such allocation possibilities and problems is
that of specific fares. The techniques may include system-wide reductions
(or increases), density-distance variations, excess-capacity traffic evaluated
in terms of marginal cost, straight promotional fares designed to take
account of different elasticities of demand, or attempts at product differ-
entiation through introduction of "new classes" of service.
Other aspects of regulatory action, however, are no less a function of
16 E.g., questions of subsidy and mail pay, see cases cited supra note 11; allowable rates for
services which are operationally distinct from scheduled service such as military contract routes;
and for charter carriers engaged in selling non-route transportation differing from flight to flight,
describing an allowable per seat-mile rate. In the latter case, a single-entity approach to specific
rates is warranted since there is no regularized pattern of production which would justify one car-
rier to differentiate between flights or consumers on a non-cost basis.
1 A particular problem arises as new aircraft with greater capacities and lower unit costs are
introduced. Realistically, the decision to purchase larger aircraft should be based on the carrier's
ability to use the increased capacity efficiently over its entire system. Of course, the lower unit costs
make it possible to obtain the same return as before, even if load factors are reduced and the car-
rier flies with empty seats, or if the aircraft is used in dense markets part of the day and the in-
creased return there compensates for increased costs arising from the plane's use in markets where
its capacity and operating characteristics are inefficient. Nevertheless, one would expect some pressure
for aircraft which could be used efficiently in the thin markets and could be used advantageously
in the dense markets despite lower capacity (e.g., operating two non-stop flights in smaller aircraft,
in place of operating a large aircraft from A to B to C, with the possibility of nonstop traffic stimu-
lation and lower operating costs compensating for duplicate fixed costs). There is a substantial
question of the technological possibility of developing such an aircraft, but the significant fact is
that the aircraft industry has not devoted any substantial research to this area, preferring to con-
centrate on larger aircraft. Even the short-haul DC-9 or Boeing 737 can hardly be called "small"
aircraft, but even in this case the impetus for domestic development came from the British BAC- 11.
Similarly, in the area of a DC-3/Convair replacement, foreign manufacturers have developed craft
such as the Fokker F-27, Nord 262 and Potez 840, while domestic companies have not been heard
from. Possibly, the restraint on domestic technological development flows from regulatory policies
in which excess capacity can be used as a barrier to prevent route and price competition. Hence
carriers are willing to purchase aircraft which may have increased costs in certain markets and
fail to demand aircraft development which might yield greater overall efficiency. See also Caves 420.
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the pricing problem. Alteration of operating authority by elimination
of mandatory stops, "closed-door" restrictions and the like have similar
effects on revenue and profit. Carrier expansion may similarly increase
efficiency, reduce break-even load factors and increase marginal revenue
per unit of resource. In the same way, concern with adequacy of service
may provide a "brake" on excessive experimentation or expansion or may
be used to enforce competition and competitive service and scheduling
practices, altering the "real fare""8 charged the consumer and increasing
the quality of service provided.
A proper view of the pricing problem must include all of these possi-
bilities. They are all possible reactions to problems of reducing costs,
increasing efficiency and competition (intercarrier competition and inter-
modal competition as well). The existence of a varied number of possible
responses to every situation is of enormous import when considering in-
creasing the latitude for managerial decision making in the air transport
field.
Of course, as we have already noted," the CAB's institutional ability
to develop an approach incorporating all of these types of factors is open
to question. It would seem, however, particularly in light of the economic
characteristics of the industry,'0 that the Board should recognize the
existence of these factors and the fact that they differ from carrier to
carrier. Such recognition could serve as a basis for allowing carriers greater
latitude in experimentation based on the carrier's evaluation of its situa-
tion. The Board would not have to involve itself in the details, but merely
establish a framework definition of reasonable competitive conduct.
At present, however, each attempted competitive response calls for an
ad hoc decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Unless proposed fares or
operating changes are not suspended prior to investigation, decisions are
reached without actual consumer or market testing. Thus, the battle is
one of competing managerial philosophies between carrier and agency,
colored heavily by the agency's conception of the best interests of the
industry. Accordingly, the agency will generally consider the competitive
reaction. The Board, by limiting the range of allowable responses to com-
petition, has generally driven competing carriers to emulation as the
standard response. In other words, the focal point for allocation of the
"components of profit" has been the same as that used to determine the
appropriate profit (or rate of return) level. The Board considers the
industry as a whole; unless the proposed allocation can successfully be
emulated by all competing carriers, the proposal must fail.
It is difficult to justify such an approach. In fact, the economics of air
transportation and the fact that carriers are sufficiently different in terms
of present equipment, route structure and efficiency suggest the opposite.
18 The term "real fare" refers to the price actually paid by the consumer in relation to the
service obtained. Hence, if adequacy of service considerations force introduction of daylight coach
service where night-coach service was previously provided but little used, the fare paid by the
average consumer has dropped even though rate structure modifications have not been made. See
Toledo Adequacy-of-Service Investigation, 30 C.A.B. 169 (1959).
'9 See Gellman, supra note 8.
" This subject will be considered in Section II B 2 infra.
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Given a multi-dimensional approach which will increase each carrier's free-
dom to act, an efficiency gaining action on the part of one carrier will not
engender an emulative response from his competitors unless it produces a
comparable efficiency for them." Factual situations supporting this con-
tention will be noted in Section III of this study. Section IV is, in part,
devoted to suggesting a regulatory policy which corresponds to the theory.
In dealing with operating authority, the Board has submerged the basic
issue with references to "need for service," "cut-throat competition,"
"balanced competition" and, when all else fails, "the public convenience
and necessity." With respect to fares and related proposals, however, the
disguise has been "discriminatory pricing." The few clear-cut cases aside,
the Board has been testing for industry-wide profitability under the rubric
of "discrimination." The result is an entirely new definition of discrimina-
tory pricing, bearing little resemblance to economic notions of discrimina-
tion nor to the historical content of the term in common carriage.
Thus, it is somewhat inappropriate to characterize what follows as a
study of airline "price discrimination." Consideration of the instances in
which the Civil Aeronautics Board has called forth the label "discrimina-
tion" to support its decisions is, in fact, an examination of the Board's
philosophy of price regulation and its role as the primary determining
factor in the development of airline competition. Consequently, it is a
desirable vehicle to employ in focusing on the distinctions between the
historic industry-wide, or "homogeneous," approach followed by the
Board and the multi-dimensional approach to price regulation suggested
herein.
II. HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AIRLINE PRICE REGULATION
After three-quarters of a century of regulation, the efficacy of federal
supervision of the transportation industries as businesses "affected with a
public interest" is hardly, if ever, questioned. As CAB Vice Chairman
Robert T. Murphy recently reminded one carrier's executives, the notion
of public responsibility for transportation has existed,
since the days of King James I . . .who, upon receiving so numerous com-
plaints from his outraged subjects regarding the ferry service and tolls then
obtaining in Merry Old England, referred the matter for resolution to his
Chancellor, Lord Hale. That learned and famous old judge thereupon laid it
down that:
Every ferry ought to be under a public regulation, to wit: that it give
attendance at due time, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable
toll.
So, the essence of this rule has been part of our Anglo-Saxon tradition and
jurisprudence for almost four centuries. 2
1 "Efficiency" is used here to describe not only the most desirable utilization of resources, but
also to include the action dictated by the carrier's self-interest after his competitor has taken some
action. Accordingly, what may have been efficient before the competitor acted may not be so after-
ward.
" Address by Robert T. Murphy Before the Eastern Air Lines Management Council, Charlotte,
N.C., 4 Feb. 1965.
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Questions of current significance, however, are not related to the existence
of agency regulation, but rather to the forms and method of regulation.
In such matters, Vice Chairman Murphy's reliance on the wisdom of Lord
Hale's formulation of the public interest will hardly suffice. The "how"
of public regulation reflected in the present managerial philosophy of the
CAB can neither be explained nor examined without reference to the his-
torical and economic facts which have produced a weighty if not always
luminous gloss on the simple principle Lord Hale set down. A brief con-
sideration of some of these factors must necessarily precede any considera-
tion of specific CAB decisions.
A. Transportation Price Discrimination:Its Historical Context
1. The Statutory Roots of the Rule Against Price Discrimination
The approach to carrier pricing practices found in the original Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938," and carried forward in the present Federal
Aviation Act of 1958,' rests on the guides formulated in the Act to
22 5 2 Stat. 973 (1938).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 737-806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1964).
The following sections are of particular importance with respect to this study:Section 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. S 1302:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties . . . the Board shall
consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in
accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(c) the promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,
or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-
transportation system ...
Section 403, 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1373:
(a) Every air carrier . . . shall file with the Board, and print, and keep open to
public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares and charges for air transportation
between points served by it and points served by any other carrier . . . when through
service and through rates shall have been established, and showing to the extent re-
quired by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations, practices and
services in connection with such air transportation ....
Section 404, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. S 1374:
(a) It shall be the duty of every air carrier . . . to provide safe and adequate
service . . . to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint
rates, fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifications, rules, regulations,
and practices relating to such air transportation ...
(b) No air carrier . . . shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air
transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any . . . [person, etc.] to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever.
Section 411, 72 Stat. 769, 49 U.S.C. § 1381:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air carrier, for-
eign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that such action by it would be in
the interest of the public, investigate whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or
ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods
of competition. ...
Section 1002, 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1482:
(d) Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon its own initiative,
the Board shall be of the opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge
. . . or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or
charge, or the value of service thereunder, is or will be unjust or unreasonable, or un-
justly discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall
determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare or charge (or the maximum or minimum,
or the minimum and maximum thereof). ...
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Regulate Commerce of 18872" which established federal regulation over
rail transportation. Thus, for example, the CAB continually refers to "like
and contemporaneous service" or "similar circumstances and conditions,"
language found in Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, but wholly
absent from aviation legislation.
The institution of regulatory supervision was called into being out of
concern for something labeled "discrimination,"2 stated politically in
terms of an egalitarian ethic and economically in terms of specific "unde-
sirable practices." For theoretical support, advocates of regulation "dust[ed]
off the musty precedents of a 'public calling' ,,2 an approach which
had already received judicial support."
As a political rallying cry, "public calling" is an attractive sounding
term. Unfortunately, it offers no guide for regulation. It is convenient to
speak of a duty to refrain from unjust discrimination as an inherent part
of common-carrier status. An examination of legal history, however, yields
no such conclusion."' All payments exacted for carriage had to be "reason-
able," but "unjust discrimination," i.e., variations between persons, com-
modities or destinations, was not prohibited."0
Obviously, there is some close alliance between "reasonable pricing" and
"discriminatory pricing," viewed here without the gloss of seventy-five
years of ICC practice. The former would seem to be directed at the rate
level, while the latter would be concerned with specific relationships within
a given rate structure-the two components of the pricing problem
described above."a In this early period, however, problems of rate levels
25Interstate Commerce Act, Part I, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-300
(1964). The following sections are relevant to the discussion here:
Section 2, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 2:
If any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, directly or in-
directly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, col-
lect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any
service . . . that it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person
. . . for doing for him . . . a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of
a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such
common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is prohibited
and declared to be unlawful.
Section 3, 24 Stat. 380, 49 U.S.C. § 3:
(1) It shall be unlawful . . . to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, asso-
ciation, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory,
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any
• . . [particular person, company, etc.] to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever ...
Section 4, 24 Stat. 380, 49 U.S.C. § 4:
(1) It shall be unlawful . . . to charge or receive any greater compensation in the
aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or like kind of property, for a shorter
than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the
shorter being included within the longer distance ...
See Dam, The Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three Regulatory
Schemes, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1963); and Keyes, Price Discrimination in Law and Economics, 27
So. Econ. J. 320 (1961).
27Meyer, Peck, Stenason & Zwick, Competition in the Transportation Industries 9 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Meyer, et al.].
2 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
29 See Kline, Origin of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination, 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 123 (1918).
'lid. at 137.
31 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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and carrier practices were restricted to Sherman Act prosecutions."a
Of course, no great exercise in verbal logistics is required to arrive at
the position that the existence of certain types of discriminations suggests
that a rate level is per se unreasonable. However, without the maximum
rate authority conferred on the ICC by the Hepburn Act in 1906' (and
even, perhaps, without the later grant of minimum-rate authority)," the
connection is tenuous at best, relying on hindsight to support an otherwise
empty argument. In short, the sounder view is that the "rule against unjust
discrimination" was wholly sui generis, that it came upon the scene simply
as a "term of art" subject to future and continuing definition by the
regulatory agency itself. The broad terms of the statute would seem to
support this contention."
The foregoing argument has substantial implications for evaluating
CAB practice and fashioning an appropriate framework for the regulation
of air transport pricing. Arguments which do no more than inveigh against
the undesirability of "discrimination" are unsatisfactory. The essential con-
cern should be toward an understanding of what sorts of discrimination
have come under attack and the situations which, at particular times, have
called certain practices into question. As one author points out: "Just,
reasonable and non-discriminatory rates will result from the application
of correct principles, not from the tautology that such rates are desirable.""a
The enactment of anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 was no more than a congressional expression of some amor-
phous public policy. Rather than being a reference to some transcendental
notion of "discrimination" to be extracted from "natural law," it calls for
definition in the light of the particular responsibilities of the CAB and
the conditions in the industry it regulates. 7
2. The Historical Meaning of "Non-Discriminatory" Rates
The basic meaning of the "rule against discrimination" stems from the
development of specific undesirable practices in the railroad industry.
Aided by speculative fervor, land grants, and personal ambition, railroad
expansion before the start of this century was both rapid and disorganized."5
" E.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Mis-
souri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
3Hepburn Act § 4, 34 Stat. 589 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1964).
'
4
Transportation Act of 1920 5 418, 41 Stat. 484 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1964).
5 See Interstate Commerce Act 5 2, supra note 25.
" Grossman, Principles of Carrier Rate Regulation, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 475, 480 (1951).
" The variations regarding certificate authority and route security between the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act of 1938 and other transportation legislation suggests that Congress (or at least Repre-
sentative Lea who authored the Act) recognized the need for new regulatory approaches owing to
the peculiar characteristics of the aviation industry. Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S
401 (g), 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964) with Interstate Commerce Act, Part II
(Motor Carrier Act), S 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1964). See also 83
Cong. Rec. 6407 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea). Apparently, Congress expected that
the needs of the aviation industry would require considerable reshuffling of operating authority. Is
it not valid to extend this same expectation of novel conditions to other provisions of the Act?
" Sorell, General Principles That Should Govern the Expansion of the Domestic Airline System
(a study by the Air Transport Association of America), in Monopoly Problems in Regulated In-
dustries-Part I, Vol. 3, Airlines, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on
the judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1706 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Monopoly Problems in
Regulated Industries, Hearings]. See also, Meyer et al. 4-7; Dearing and Owens, National Trans-
portation Policy 229 (1949); Dewey, The Long and Short Haul Principle of Rate Regulation 1
(1935); and Koontz, Government Control of Business 81 (1941).
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High fixed costs associated with railway construction and operation meant
that within specific geographic areas, "natural monopolies" were obtained.
Parallel route structures in marginal traffic areas were limited by con-
spiratorial agreement; in the long-haul point-to-point markets, however,
they yielded intensive competition. In these latter markets, rail carriers
faced not only intramodal competition, but substantial intermodal com-
petition as well."' The economic structure induced a compulsion to cultivate
volume traffic, driving rates to the floor set by short-run marginal costs.
Thus, neither monopoly power nor competitive chaos is acceptable as a
uniform characterization of the early railroad industry.
Clearly, both conditions were present. The need for regulation, however,
stems less from the public interest inherent in either characterization (i.e.,
some notion that "balanced competition" is automatically necessary in
transportation industries) and more from the fact that the benefits and
detriments of both power and competition had clear-cut geographic appli-
cations. Traffic volume can only be cultivated where large shippers are
found. Rate reductions will have less significant effect unless those shippers
are highly competitive. Once rates are set below the total average cost,
each below cost price produces an amount which must be recouped if
total average costs are to be covered. The easiest source of such additional
revenue is within the natural monopoly area. Such recoupment, however,
is possible only where shippers are small and where their competition, if
any, will be similarly affected, else the higher rate will operate to restrict
the much needed volume.40 These conditions were met by the distribution
of manufacturing and agriculture between east and west. The eastern
region of the United States had both the large, competitive, shippers and
the intense transport competition. The agricultural regions, on the other
hand, were the natural monopoly areas for the railroads, and the con-
sumers of transportation were small agricultural producers or new entrants
in manufacturing.
It is hardly surprising, then, that rail regulatory legislation became one
of the keystones of the Populist movement in the middle western states.
It is essential, however, that the embodiment of their protests in statutory
language be understood in terms of their specific grievances. Despite the
broad language of Section 2, 3, and 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce'"-
covering persons, commodities and localities--the vice complained of was
not differential pricing in itself. The focus is not on "like and contempo-
raneous service." Rather, the emphasis is on the "exaction by the carrier
of varying rates from different persons"4 who, because of their economic
status, should be treated equally.
Arguably, the intent of Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, viewed in this
historical setting, is directed toward a single type of discriminatory prac-
'Meyer, et al. 5. See also Koontz, op. cit. supra note 38, at 92, 112.
40 Two other conditions are helpful. First, the product being shipped should have a low value
with respect to the total price of the finished product to the consumer. Second, the shipper should
be under an economic compulsion to ship at whatever price he gets for his product.
41 Set out supra note 25.
42 Dearing & Owens, op. cit. supra note 38, at 230.
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tice: the use of rebates and preferences for individual shippers which, as
noted above, necessarily was confined to particular localities and particular
types of traffic. This attitude is clearly reflected in the opinion of a middle
western district judge:
Secret rates will inevitably become discriminating rates. Whenever discrim-
inating rates or practices are made public, a thousand forces of self-interest
and of public policy will be set at work to reduce them to fairness and
equality.43
The sole grievance not amenable to categorization as a form of secret
rebate or preference was the so-called "long-and-short haul discrimina-
tion," dealt with specifically in Section 4 of the Act. This, too, goes no
farther than is necessary to combat the specific practice complained of.
Certainly, if the intent was to establish a principle of uniform pricing,
the application of the section would not have been limited to receipt of
"greater compensation in the aggregate" (emphasis added) nor to only
those situations where the short haul is included wholly within the longer
distance.
It is easy to capsule the history of the movement toward rail regulation
with a statement such as "the public discovered by experience that whether
the railway industry was competitive or monopolized, it was incapable
under a regime of laissez faire of securing just and reasonable rates to all
persons." '44 If "just and reasonable rates" is taken to mean a rate structure
wholly devoid of differential pricing, the summary goes too far. It sug-
gests that this is to be the goal of regulation. The most that can be said
is that past the two specific discriminations already discussed, proponents
of regulation evidenced a desire to withdraw pricing practices from the
domain of private government and place them in an open, public forum.
This does not mean, however, that all pricing practices, in all transporta-
tion industries, should be withdrawn from the market and determined by
an agency. The requirement of publicly filed tariffs simply makes such
consideration possible. Substantive agency intervention is only necessary
when conditions in the specific industry make reliance on competition
impossible.
The range of discriminations beyond secret preferences, rebates, and
long-and-short haul policy are, therefore, products of the regulatory
process tied to specific conditions relevant to the industry under regula-
tion. The present elaborate system of "value of service" pricing, wholly
unrelated to costs, is a consequence of rate regulation.4 Putting aside any
question of its efficacy as a method of allocation, the issue of "discrimina-
tion" in a value of service scheme revolves less around the appropriate way
for a rail carrier to price his product and more around the effect the pro-
posal will have on the shipper's industry. While the structural scheme was
far less elaborate than today, many such differentials were inherited by
the ICC. Given the pervasive influence of rail rates on the location and
'United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R., 168 Fed. 546 (S.D. Il1. 1909).
44Dewey, op. cit. supra note 38, at 1.
45 Meyer, et al. 7-8, 178-79.
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development of industries, there is some force in the argument that "the
Commission can hardly upset these fine balances."4
For the purposes of this study, however, the significant fact is that the
Civil Aeronautics Board has not inherited such a scheme, nor even with
the growth of air cargo does the air transport industry reach the level of
a "universal input" in all production processes. The effects of rate struc-
ture alterations in air transportation are therefore unlikely to effect whole-
sale changes in the economy. Hence, one major reason for withdrawing
rail pricing from the market place at the turn of the century is absent in
air transportation. For the CAB, the question is solely one of the tech-
niques available to the air carrier for pricing his product."
3. The Shift from Consumer Protection to "Competitive" Balance
Following the passage of the Motor Carrier Act,"8 the term "discrimina-
tion" acquired a new hue. By placing rail and motor carrier regulation
under the control of a single agency, problems of carrier pricing became
inextricably bound with planned "modal balance," a protectionist philoso-
phy euphemistically disguised as "national transportation policy."
Rather than focusing on the "historical" concern with "exploitation"
of consumers, emphasis was significantly re-directed toward limiting price
competition. 9 To be sure, the policy yielded some beneficial trends in
pricing policy. These arose, however, from particular competitive biases
rather than from a general belief in the soundness of an allocative technique
(e.g., cost-related pricing) standing alone. Thus, the ICC "required the
truckers to base their rates upon the fully allocated cost (constant and
variable costs) theory of rate-making while the railroads were permitted
to establish rates upon an added cost basis."" ° Even if one wishes to accept
the efficacy of the protectionist scheme, it is unnecessary to characterize
proposed rate structure changes by motor-carriers as "discriminatory" and
justify identical rail practices as "meeting competition." Indeed, it might
be more appropriate to refer to the present motor-carrier rate structure as
a system of discrimination and then justify it by indicating that it was
required by the public interest involved in protecting the railroads. This,
at least, would satisfy any academic concern with theories of transport
46 Koontz, op. cit. supra note 38, at 109. See also, Fifteen Percent Case, 226 I.C.C. 41 (1938)
(blanket increase of certain percentage applied to all rates impracticable).
"' This is not to say that air carrier pricing based on factors outside the conditions of carriage
(or, more properly, based on factors not relevant to the carrier's self-interest) is to be treated as
a desirable technique. The question of "societal" justifications for rate differentials will be treated
infra in a discussion of "identity" fares.
48 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, 49 Stat. 543-67 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §5 301-27 (1964).
41 See generally Williams, The Regulation Of Rail-Motor Rate Competition (1958), and par-
ticularly at 92-115 (ICC § 4 cases). The justification for limiting price competition looks back
toward pre-1887 conditions, but arguably, as suggested earlier, price competition was more a
symptom of particular conditions than the cause of the grievance; the provisions of the Act to
Regulate Commerce (now Interstate Commerce Act, Part I, supra note 25) were sufficient to con-
trol those conditions. Intermodal competition was not complained of except as it, too, was localized
geographically, a situation which was not present in 1935. The trend toward limiting price com-
petition seems to have been built on post-depression psychoses, although it did not receive explicit
consideration as such.
50 Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads and the Puhlic In-
terest, 61 Yale L.J. 467, 496 (1952). See also, Roberts, The Regulation of Transport Price Com-
petition, 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 557 (1959).
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pricing." Obviously, such a blunt statement would be politically un-
desirable." However, it would have eliminated any possibility of fostering
the "transcendental" approach to discrimination in which the ICC's ap-
proach to discrimination and pricing is thought to apply with equal force
to all transportation modes.
4. The Distinctive Position of the Airline Industry
The significance of the foregoing for air carrier regulation is clear.
Except, perhaps, for specific problems with the all-cargo carriers,53 com-
mercial air transport has not faced intermodal conflict within the regula-
tory process. Thus, if the Civil Aeronautics Board adopts the position that
certain price practices are discriminatory per se or required a "meeting
competition" justification, it errs in converting a "term of art" designed
with reference to peculiar rail characteristics and problems of rail-motor
competition into a general principle.
Reference to history yields but two such general principles, the "classic"
discriminations of rebating and secret preferences. Such discrimination is
avoided by requiring adherence to publicly filed tariffs and demanding
that differentiated services be functionally" available to a significant
group.5s
Given the economic and technological characteristics of air transporta-
tion, "unjust discrimination" should be defined simply as:
(1) the remission of rebates to consumers, in secret or by indirect
methods;s
51 Not that the result in practice would have been correct. At least, however, there would have
been some recognition of the fact that alterations in historic rate-making practices were not "dis-
crimination." The battle would then properly have focused on the agency's conception of the public
interest and notions of "discrimination" would not have floated over to regulatory agencies where
the intermodal competition problem was absent.
5' Consider, for example, the range of political pressures affecting the amendment of § 15 of
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1958 (Transportation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 572 (1958), 49
U.S.C. § 15(a) (3) (1964)) detailed in Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards-Ill, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1263, 1288 (1962).
" The problems posed by the all-cargo carriers do resemble the intermodal conflict in the ICC.
However, the CAB's approach to these carriers is not shrouded in irrelevant legalism. The attempt
to provide "water wings" for this sinking segment of the airline industry is being made openly
and without recourse to "discrimination." See Extemporaneous Remarks by Alan S. Boyd, [then]
Chairman, CAB, Before the Fourth Annual Air Cargo Seminar, Commodore Hotel, New York City,
14 Feb. 1962; CAB Regulation No. PS-24 (7 Aug. 1964) (policy statement on all-cargo carriers
blocked-space tariffs); and Trans World Airlines, CAB Docket Nos. 15829 & 15831, CAB Order
No. E-21820 (19 Feb. 1965) (rejecting combination-carrier blocked-space rates). The Board's policy
may not be economically sound, but the visibility of its decision making focuses attention on the
public policy features of the CAB's position.
54 Regarding "functional" availability, see FTC v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 42 (1948).
s A similar view has been infrequently espoused in CAB cases, twice in hearing examiners' initial
decisions: National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951), considered
in text following note 175 infra; Trans World Airlines Siesta Sleeper-Seat Service, 27 C.A.B. 788
(1958), considered in text following note 278 infra, and in one early CAB opinion: Air Passenger
Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942), see text accompanying note 117 infra.
"' See, e.g., Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., and Henry F. Price, Enforcement Proceeding, 31 C.A.B.
415 (1960), aff'd sub nom. Las Vegas Hacienda v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 885 (1962); Pan American Ferry Flight Case, 18 C.A.B. 214 (1953). The possible reach
of the indirect rebate prohibition is reflected in Private Airline Club Waiting Rooms, CAB Docket
No. 13448, CAB Order No. E-18102 (14 March 1962) (instituting investigation), 27 Fed. Reg.
2612 (1962).
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(2) the granting of secret preferences;"' and
(3) the filing of tariffs which fall short of the first two categories be-
cause they are public, but are not functionally available to a significant
group of consumers, functional availability being a quantitative inquiry
to be made by the Board and "significance" being a qualitative criterion
(e.g., elasticity of demand) which an air carrier must support with refer-
ence to its own theories of costing, subject only to a "good faith" test by
the agency.
Beyond this, price regulation policy must rest wholly on factors indige-
nous to air transport, and, as already noted, this study submits that these
factors indicate that CAB concern should be directed primarily to ques-
tions of general price level, leaving carriers wide latitude to employ ex-
perimental techniques in order to obtain that over-all rate of return."
B. The Relation Of Economics To Rate Regulation
1. The Role of Social and Political Considerations
Economists are quick to remind us that "price discrimination," as used
by regulatory agencies in the course of their decisions, bears little relation,
if any, to discrimination in an economic sense. As Caves, for one, points
out:
Any economist . . .with a theoretical definition of price discrimination in
mind is immediately struck by the spottiness and selectivity with which the
regulators act .... Some forms of discrimination are banned entirely while
others are tolerated or even encouraged and required. Some pricing phenomena
are branded discriminatory and banned even though they do not or at least
may not meet the economist's definition of price discrimination."
However, even if we recognize that the regulatory definition of price dis-
crimination stems from social and political theories rather than any eco-
nomic base, economic analysis cannot be ignored in determining the
regulatory policy which is best suited for attaining the social and political
goals.
Let us assume, arguendo, that the historical analysis of the rule against
discrimination set forth above is inaccurate and that in fact the CAB
inherited, at the outset, a well-developed series of per se rules thought to
govern all forms of transportation. Application of such rules to the airline
industry is justifiable as a matter of public policy only if, in fact, the
airline industry has the same technological and economic characteristics
as the earlier forms of transportation. Of course, the air carrier industry
is easily distinguishable from rail and motor carriers on the basis of tech-
"s See, e.g., Investigation of Seaboard & Western Airlines, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 372 (1950); Viking
Airliners, Aero-Van Express Corp., & Viking Air Transport Co.-Non-Certificated Operations, 11
C.A.B. 401 (1950); United Air Lines, Inc.-Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 15714,
CAB Order No. E-21903 (15 March 1965) (cease and desist order); and Trans-Caribbean Airways,
Inc.-Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 15682, CAB Order No. E-22391 (30 June 1965)
(cease and desist order).
" Of course, in considering level and rate-of-return, the CAB must not allow a carrier to bene-
fit from its own mistakes. Hence, if a carrier (or the industry) falls below a desired return, the
CAB should be obliged to consider the possibility that the deficiency arises from unsound manage-
ment. For example, it might increase the "revenue" figure used by the amount of revenue lost
through "self-diversion" to an unjustifiable special fare and judge the return on that basis.
0' Caves 155-56. See also, Dam, supra note 26, and Keyes, supra note 26.
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nology and economics. Thus, the automatic application of theories de-
veloped on account of the peculiar characteristics of rail and motor trans-
port is not simply an instance of bad economics. It is: irrational public
policy.
2. The Significant Economic Factors in Air Transport
From an economic standpoint, the differences between the air transport
industry and other modes of transportation make the "dangers" of air
carrier competition both qualitatively and quantitatively less than any
which were ever supported to exist in surface transportation. "
Unlike the railroad industry, air transportation reflects few economies
of scale built on size alone. Even within a single market, it is claimed
that "operating costs tend to become constant or to flatten out at around
five to seven frequencies per day."'"
Thus, in commercial aviation, not only is size a less crucial factor, but
also, an air carrier runs little risk in re-allocating his productive resources:
reducing frequencies in one market and increasing them in another; chang-
ing service patterns; re-assigning different aircraft to different markets,
etc. Particularly with a good market for used aircraft, the carrier sacri-
fices little, in terms of economics of scale, by contracting his investment,
so long as he does not fall below the minimums essential for efficient opera-
tion and satisfactory earnings potential."'
There are further distinctions between surface and air carriers in terms
of operating economies of scale as to distance and volume. While the ICC
has consistently represented that motor carrier line-haul costs decline with
distance,6' line-haul costs for all surface carriers are actually constant for
all mileage blocks." Direct operating costs for air carriers, on the other
hand, have a clear distance taper, varying with the technological character-
istics of the aircraft used.6' Moreover, an air carrier is able to increase,
efficiency by attempting to maximize stage length. The cost of travel
between A and B is increased more than one-third if made in seven
hundred-mile stages than if it were non-stop.
6 The fear of cut-throat competition and unsound practices may stem, in part, from the ridicu-
lously low competitive bidding for air mail routes before passage of the 1938 Act. See Caves 124.
(Braniff Airlines bid $0.00001907378 per plane-mile for a Houston-San Antonio mail route, but
was high bidder over Eastern's $0.00 bid.) See also, Pan American Airways Co.-Mail Rates, 1
C.A.A. 220, 249 (1939). This situation, however, stemmed solely from regulatory provisions al-
lowing the contractor to renegotiate a fair rate after one year of operation. It did not arise from
actual industry conditions.
61 Northwest Airlines, Inc-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 627,
639 (1941). With larger aircraft, capable of carrying greater revenue per flight, it is probable that
unit costs flatten out at even less frequencies, assuming that the spacing of frequencies does not
distort any variable. See also, Exhibits of Bureau Counsel BC-708, Contractibility of Airline Ex-
penses, General Passenger Fare Investigation, supra note 11 and Caves 59, 81-82.
" The minimum efficient point represents only 2-4% of the industry's actual production. Caves
86. The level necessary for potentially satisfactory returns on investment would seem to be some-
what higher, suPra note 3, but not significantly higher as would effect the conclusions herein.
" ICC, Cost Study of Class I Carriers (1953).
"See Meyer, et al. 93, 156, 190. The ICC data rests on a spurious correlation reflecting the fact
that long-distance shipments have greater volume.
" Caves 76. Aircraft operating costs tend to be U-shaped since at some point payload must be
sacrificed to accommodate the fuel needed for a long stage. In 1958, Caves found that:the direct
costs for a 2250 mile trip exceeded those for a 1750 mile trip (on a per revenue passenger mile
basis). Today, the point at which the curve begins to rise is much higher, well beyond the standard
transcontinental stages of domestic operations.
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Similar differences exist with regard to economies from volume carried.
All transport modes reflect economies in terms of volume, viewed alone or
in conjunction with the distance of the haul."s The significant difference is
in how this volume is carried. The rail carrier is more concerned with the
total volume he can realize in any time-block (week, month, etc.) rather
than the distribution of timing preferences within that block. His volume
capability and related flexibility lead him to focus on the long-run market
share he can obtain.
The air carrier's concerns regarding volume are significantly different.
The volume capability of each productive unit is comparatively small and
power is technologically fused with available space; aircraft cannot be
"ganged" with a single power unit as railway cars can. The air carrier thus
quickly reaches the point where additional volume requires major added
investment. But, where in the long-run rail carriers may have more flexi-
bility in dealing with volume, in the short-run, the positions are reversed;
the air carrier's additional volume comes in small uniform units, posing no
problem whatsoever for the management of traffic.
Thus, the air carrier should be less concerned with his long-run market
share, except as it bears on the load factors for particular flights. Because
of speed, timing has increased significance and consumers may have differ-
ent degrees of flexibility in timing preference. While other motives may
lead the air carrier to seek increased volume, efficient operation only dic-
tates that a limited quantity of additional volume be sought. Furthermore,
the air carrier is encouraged to concentrate on the development of par-
ticular types of additional volume, in particular markets and among par-
ticular types of consumers.
In short, differences in economics of scale between air transport and
surface modes provide substantial economic justification for differential
pricing schemes based on trip length or type of consumer which are not
found in other transport modes.
The market factors in air transportation lead to similar conclusions.
Unlike the true "value of service" discrimination, differentiation of the
air travel market by type of travel has a correlative cost dimension with
regard to routes flown, distance, and type of service. The businessman may
fly more often and more consistently, but he flies to a wider range of
destinations, uses short-haul services more often, has keener time prefer-
ences, and is more often a first-class passenger. In a peak/off-peak scheme
of utility pricing, he would be considered the peak user. 7 Such a scheme
"See Caves 153-57.
67 Consider the problem of American Airlines before reducing long-haul first-class fares in Jan-
uary 1964. A first-class seat costs more to produce and in theory should yield higher revenues.
However, because of low first-class load factors and the low family-fare level, a coach seat was
producing more revenue per available seat-mile than a first-class seat. The low load factors were
in part a result of United's one-class service. Accordingly, American reduced first-class fares,
basically to the benefit of the peak-user businessman. This suggests that in a competitive system
where the competition is able to alter its pricing structure, the peak-user cannot be charged a price
which is higher than that resulting from his actual demand on the carrier's productive capacity.
Thus, in a sense, United's one-class service worked to eliminate some "discrimination" against the
first-class passenger. However, as we shall note infra, under the regulatory philosophy normally used
by the CAB, it would have been United's service that would have been labeled "discriminatory."
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must raise at least two questions. First, to what extent should grand-
mothers flying to San Francisco subsidize businessmen flying to Schenec-
tady? Second, should not grandmothers" who might consider flying to
Schenectady be treated differently than businessmen?69
Moreover, the "market structure of air transportation is not one that
would yield abnormally high profits under unregulated operation."7 Given
the economics and technology, the problem of discrimination is in one
sense greater than in other modes as the number of alternatives are almost
unlimited. On the other hand, in view of the possibility of reallocation
of resources and the technological flexibility of current aircraft,"5 detri-
ment to the industry or consumer is unlikely, particularly where carriers
are able to use their potential for efficiency by being able to choose from
among the wide range of alternatives. In other words, one may argue that
"discrimination," as popularly perceived, is possible. One cannot, however,
in light of the economic characteristics of air transportation, argue that
such freedom would produce discriminations which are "unjust," as rail
and rail-motor competition is thought to have produced. The public policy
of regulation must be shaped with this in mind.
C. The Responsibility For The Application Of Economic Theory
If economic factors are to have any effect on the price regulation de-
cisions of the CAB, they must be evidenced in concrete terms. Advocacy
of a regulatory philosophy which gives carriers increased latitude in pric-
ing decisions in light of their individual needs should not be equated with
a policy of giving carriers carte blanche to experiment without assessing
the cost and revenue consequences of their proposals before they are im-
plemented. Rather, the necessity of setting forth an analysis of the prob-
able economic result is a matter of increased importance. If a carrier is
free to adopt a pricing structure which cannot be supported by an
analytical presentation of market conditions or operating data, its com-
68, Grandmothers" is simply an illustrative example of a passenger who does not fit the business
travel norm. It would also include businessmen to the extent that they deviate from the norm by
using "no-reservation" services, etc.
"' The problem is much more complex than the simple formulation in the text. In the short-
haul market, the businessman is more likely to fly because of the time advantage, but the "grand-
mother" is more cost-conscious. The maintenance of fare levels in the long-haul markets which
do not fully reflect economies of scale in traffic volume and distance is thought to be demanded by
the CAB's concept of "internal subsidization." However, characterizing the practice as subsidization
is inaccurate since it suggests that the carrier is using profits in one market to offset unavoidable
losses in another. In the short-haul market, even if the basic fare was maintained, the carrier
could increase profit by selling excess capacity to "grandmothers" at marginal profit factors. And,
to the extent that the business market is truly stable, a fare increase is always another alternative.
Hence "subsidization" only occurs in the sense that the CAB prevents carriers from adopting pric-
ing techniques which vary from market-to-market attempting to find a balance between the forces
which cut down the demand elasticity of regular users of air transportation and the rising interest
in air transportation which is appearing among cost-conscious infrequent travelers. See also, Caves
35-36.
70 Caves 136.
7 An examination of operating statistics by carriers and aircraft type shows the wide range of
cost results which depend on the way in which aircraft are used. The flexibility in reallocating
productive resources is further increased by the fact that the range of stage lengths and profitable
load factors for short, medium, and long-range aircraft overlap considerably. It is thus possible to
match density, frequency, and available capacity more closely. Moreover, reallocation should not
yield adverse economic results. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. A balance between density,
frequency, and available capacity may be struck at various size levels.
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petitors will be encouraged to meet competition by similarly irrational
proposals. Increasing the range of alternatives open to air carrier manage-
ment is justified only to the extent that it will encourage efficient alloca-
tion of resources. Absent any compulsion to estimate (and later evaluate)
the efficacy of a pricing theory in terms of its cost and revenue effects,
this goal cannot be achieved.
As already suggested, the relevant costs which yield a basis for regulatory
policy will vary depending on whether the inquiry is in terms of price or
subsidy level (to develop a rate-of-return or class-rate model)"' or is in
terms of particular fares, types of fares and operations within a particular
market.73 In other words, the central issue in the air transport industry is
not cost-finding per se,74 but rather the selection and application of appro-
priate costing techniques in varying circumstances and recognition of
the fact that use of one or another technique may be desirable depending
on the issue under consideration and the carrier involved.
An examination of CAB decisions in the pricing field reveals but few
instances in which the question of appropriate costing techniques is given
serious attention and forms the basis for the Board's decision."' More often,
Board decisions, and carrier proposals as well, are characterized by the
absence of relevant economic data. Any attempt to explain the failure of
72 See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
"' While questions of operating authority and adequacy-of-service should be incorporated into
this second category, one qualification is necessary. Where the inquiry is designed to determine the
point at which fare policies have an adverse effect on the adequacy-of-service in a market (e.g.,
action by carrier A, albeit in "good faith," which makes it impossible for carrier B to continue
serving or carrier C to enter and where competition is necessary to provide adequate frequency or
type of service and avoid distortion in other markets served by A) the costs which are relevant
are much more like those in the "level, subsidy, rate-of-return" category. Under present regulatory
restrictions, the point at which an adverse effect might occur is relatively low so that most pro-
posals by A precipitate concern for the health of the industry. Part of this is a matter of regulatory
attitudes, but with greater freedom, the "point" would be much higher and would rarely be reached.
'4 Great emphasis has been placed on cost-finding programs in transportation. See Kennedy, 1962
Transportation Message to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). Meyer
et al. is an outstanding example of scholarly work in this field. The air transportation industry has
less barriers to cost-finding than surface modes in which joint-costs predominate and the number of
historic commodity classifications and varying commodity characteristics (volume-density relations,
special equipment, etc.) make the costs to be found qualitatively as well as quantitatively difficult.
The question for air carriers is how costs will be reflected in rates; cost-finding per se is relatively
easy.
"5 The only example of any real significance is the Board's recent adoption of Examiner Herbert
K. Bryan's Initial Decision in Business and Economy Fares, CAB Docket No. 13939 et al., CAB Order
Nos. E-22103, E-22104 (29 April 1965). Examiner Bryan spends the major part of his decision
considering questions such as the use of available seat-miles or revenue passenger-miles as the basis
for unit costs; the use of a percentage-of-aircraft allocation for costs on multiple configuration
flights; and the relation between stimulation factors and gross revenue as a factor in the reasonable-
ness of a fare ratio between two classes of service. The opinion fails to deal with all of these prob-
lems satisfactorily in that it approaches each dimension singly instead of fashioning a framework
which integrates density, demand and alternatives open to carriers and consumers. E.g., a $92.50
economy fare will yield the same revenue result as a $105.45 coach fare if traffic is stimulated 14%.
This, however, assumes that all former coach passengers will use economy services and that there
will be only 14% new traffic. The revenue results (and the fare derived by the calculation) will
vary if 10% of present coach traffic continues to use coach services and there is still a 14% overall
increase in coach and economy traffic. (Assuming that present coach traffic = 100, and coach
traffic uses economy services, the increase amounts to 14 new passengers, all passengers paying
$92.50; in the alternative example, 10 passengers pay $105.45 and 104 pay $92.50. If revenue parity
is sought, the fare then must be somewhat lower than $92.50). The fare calculation would also
have to be adjusted to the extent demand and capacity were not evenly matched. One cannot find
serious fault with the Examiner, however, inasmuch as the reasonableness of the fare being investi-
gated was patent at the outset.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
the carriers to submit such data would require detailed consideration of
each proposal involved. However, one can hardly ignore the possibility
that the carriers, recognizing the Board's apparent reluctance to consider
more sophisticated forms of economic analysis, have deemed it more ad-
visable to rest many of their proposals on generalizations, hoping that the
use of the proper "catch-words" or of undiscussed citations to prior cases
(in which the basis for decision may also be unsupported) will strike a
responsive chord in the agency."
No one can seriously contend that the Board's staff (if not the members
themselves) are unaware of the range of possible costing techniques which
might be applied to carrier price proposals. Indeed, in those instances where
recognition of significant differences in a carrier's operation has a negligible
effect on its competitive position, costing techniques have been allowed to
reflect such differences.
For example, Pan American Airways' original transatlantic certificate
contemplated two different routes with different mileages between the
same final terminii. In Pan American Airways Company (Del.)-Mail
Rates," the agency's subsidy determination allocated fixed costs in terms
of their actual use:
Whether a particular route be used on a major or minor portion of the total
number of trips, much the same facilities must be maintained. The fixed por-
tion of the total cost of the operation, therefore, may best be regarded as
divided among the total number of trips to be flown in a given year, with the
amount of total cost so allocated per trip to be the same whatever route may
be used in a particular instance.7"
Carried forward to pricing policy, this approach suggests two possibilities.
First, a uniform per-mile rate might be inapplicable (or, conversely, a
differential per-mile rate might be justifiable), since on a per-mile basis,
the cost for one route is lower than for another. Second, a differential in
the density of each route might be used to determine the total charge per
trip, since the carrier's out-of-pocket cost is allocated equally between
flights on either route.'
A corresponding theory, regarding operating costs, is raised in Pennsyl-
vania-Central Airlines Corporation-Service to Atlantic City, N.J.," con-
sidering applications by three carriers to serve that community. Eastern
Air Lines, one of the applicants, already flew between New York and
Baltimore and New York and Washington. It proposed to divert some of
these flights, adding the stop at Atlantic City. The question, then, was
whether Eastern's cost should be the added twenty miles of flying needed
to include the stop, or whether the full mileage between the three cities
should have been used." The Board found it unnecessary to decide the
76 E.g., references to "generating new traffic," asserting "cost savings" (or their absence), or
claiming that a proposal is "economically unsound."
71 C.A.A. 220 (1939).
78 Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
79 "Might" is the important word, since other factors might tend to influence the carrier's de-
cision. This approach, however, would be justifiable.
603 C.A.B. 144 (1941).
$'[d. at 152-53.
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issue; however, the theory, known as "double circuity costing," is often
used to determine the profitability of services to a community."s
Obviously, direct application of such a principle to the field of fares
would yield anomalous results, since, no matter what distance is involved,
a city located on a direct line between two other points has: a circuity cost
of zero. The importance of the circuity approach lies in its orientation
to marginal cost. Indeed, the Board's opinion in Service to Atlantic City
seems to suggest that Eastern would have to make some allowance in "cost"
for the traffic it would lose to competitors by downgrading a non-stop
flight to serve Atlantic City. Stated differently, costing techniques should
consider the actual alternatives of employing productive resources. This
alternative is expressed as circuity cost when the point-in-issue is service
to a particular community. Regarding fare policies, the alternatives depend
on the structure and efficiency of the carrier and the freedom to act which
regulatory policy accords him.
Owing to a regulatory bias against considering distinctive characteristics
of individual carriers and the resulting limitations on the carriers' free-
dom of action, the approach suggested above has received little attention
by carriers or the Board. Indeed, the first mention of a promotional fare
practice in the agency's opinions lacks any comment on the subject of
cost.
s
A curious ambivalence regarding cost is also exhibited in Capital Group
Student Fares.s" Here, the Board chastized Capital for failing to provide
cost-savings data in connection with its proposal to offer twenty-five per-
son student groups a reduced fare. While disapproving the reduced rate,
the Board indicated that it would remand the proposal to the hearing
examiner, if Capital agreed to remove the student restriction. Several
months later, this new proposal was approved, the continued absence
of cost data notwithstanding.'
Generally, if the Board looks to cost in connection with fare structure
or promotional inquiries, the cost factors examined are not those associated
with the carrier's over-all operations, but rather the cost of the service
features deleted or added. It is disconcerting, and of questionable value,
to see a CAB hearing examiner attempt to evaluate the costs of cloth
napkins, choicer cuts of meat and an additional toilet in the aircraft and
apply these to passenger fares."6
The area of promotional fares is generally one in which the discussion
of cost-of-service differences tends to cloud the more significant issue of
maximizing the efficient use of resources:
In theory, the profitable use of price discrimination consists of setting dif-
82 This approach does not always yield an accurate portrayal of cost since the "circuity cost"
of a terminal point will be based on the actual mileage between the last intermediate and the termi-
nal, there being no third point against which circuity may be calculated. Accordingly, service to all
of the intermediates can be treated as "profitable" when the route taken as a whole is not.
"a Western Air Express Corp.-Mail Rates, 1 C.A.A. 341, 349-50 (1939).
14 25 C.A.B. 280 (1957).
s Capital Group Student Fares, 26 C.A.B. 451 (1958).
SUnited Custom Coach, 26 C.A.B. 23, 27-37 (1957) (excerpts from the Initial Decision of
Examiner Ferdinand D. Moran).
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ferent profit margins for sales to different groups of customers. Intrinsically,
it depends on demand (elasticity) differences, and the presence or absence of
cost (level) differences is unimportant.87
Hence, to require this type of cost difference for promotional pricing
devices is to suggest a per se rule against discrimination. While the CAB
decisions (to be considered infra) clearly belie the existence of any such
rule, it would appear that the Board has often "waived" application of
the rule in certain circumstances rather than recognize that the factors
being considered are not always relevant."
The area which the Board has ignored-costing techniques reflecting
marginal costs and other factors varying from carrier to carrier-is a
particularly complex one. As Caves notes:
[T]he levels of most activities carried on by an airline are not rigidly related
to one another. Total passenger-miles can vary significantly without causing
proportional changes in plane-miles flown, aircraft operated, reservations and
sales personnel employed or many other factors. . . . In airlines and the other
service industries it is hopeless to try to make a distinction between production
cost and promotion expenditures. Faced with a seasonal or cyclical fall of de-
mand, an airline may well maintain its output level as an investment in pro-
tecting its future market share. 9
However complex, these are the costs which yield justifications for carrier
pricing approaches. What is significant is that Congress has generally
left control over the factors producing these costs in the hands of the
carriers themselves."0 Accordingly, it does not seem too outrageous to
suggest that this congressional policy can best be effectuated by giving
carriers similar latitude to develop costing techniques built on their
respective operations and apply these to their fares, subject only to a
requirement that data be introduced to evidence the "good-faith" nature
of the particular fare modification.
III. THE Ad Hoc APPROACH TO PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Introduction-The Basis For The CAB's Managerial Philosophy
The historical and economic factors heretofore presented suggest that
87 Caves 162.
8" See discussion of Business and Economy Fares, supra note 75. Had the CAB truly accepted
the examiner's economic analysis as the justification for approving three-level fares in the Chicago-
Los Angeles market, it would have had to make a similar analysis to approve Continental's Houston-
Los Angeles three-level structure. The fact that the Board relied on the Chicago-Los Angeles find-
ings as the rationale for dismissing the latter proceeding, Continental Air Lines, Inc. (economy
fares in the Houston-Los Angeles market), CAB Docket No. 15245, CAB Order No. E-22195
(21 May 1965), suggests that the question of "discrimination" was simply "waived." In fact, the
Houston-Los Angeles rate structure is justified principally by the fact that Continental would be
unable to utilize its equipment efficiently if it could not operate the same aircraft in both markets.
The CAB's assertion that the markets are similar is highly inaccurate, since there is no equivalent
to United's one-class service in the Houston-Los Angeles market and therefore no justification for
authorizing five-abreast seating (with first-class seats) at coach fares. Of course, under the view
espoused herein, such a practice is not at all discriminatory.
89 Caves 82.
"°Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 401 (e), 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (e) (1964):
No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air
carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities
for performing the authorized transportation and service as the development of the
business and the demands of the public shall require. ...
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the Civil Aeronautics Board had carte blanche to evolve a new regulatory
framework for commercial air transport and, indeed, had an obligation
to do so with particular reliance on the unique congressional declaration
in favor of competition." However, the history of CAB action in pricing
and related fields indicates that the Board has chosen to ignore the oppor-
tunity. Despite the frequent decisional references to ICC case law and
recourse to "familiar" categories of "discrimination" (like and contem-
poraneous service; the rule of equality; undue prejudice to a locality,
etc.) ,' it is inconceivable to suggest that the Board's members have felt
themselves bound by the regulatory counterpart of stare decisis. Rather,
such tests have been used because they are in accord with a philosophy of
regulation: a managerial philosophy in which the legislative mandate of
competition "to the extent necessary" serves as the rationale for carteliza-
tion by regulation.
Of course, not every decision and order of the Board can be relied on
to support such an indictment. On various occasions, the Board has
departed from its "cartel-in-the-public-interest" philosophy. Until recent-
ly, however, it has been most closely adhered to in the most significant
area: carrier pricing practices.
The notion of cartelization by regulation is curious indeed. A rational
cartel would presumably allocate territories to take account of any exist-
ing economies of scale. Absent economies of scale, it would presumably
act to keep the price level high, but where over-all economies of scale
were slight and each producer had the technological and financial ability
to utilize his resources in varying degrees in any one of a number of
markets, a cartel would be an unlikely result. It would seem even more
unlikely where, as in air transport, a large consumer market remains to
be tapped. The Board, however, has traditionally certified more carriers in
the long-haul markets where operating economies are present," while at
the same time ignoring the fact that fares in these markts are higher-than-
average 4 and initially attempting to forestall attempts to have the fare
structure reflect the economies in long-haul operations."
Thus striving for a theoretical "best of both worlds," the Board ends
up with neither. It allocates routes in precisely the opposite way of a ra-
tional cartel, but restricts the competitive tendencies flowing from that
allocation. At the same time, it speaks of the need for efficient operations
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(d), 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1964)
set out supra note 24.
"For a discussion of CAB decisions analyzed on the basis of these "tests," see Caves 160-64.
93 Id. at 19. A rational cartel would most probably do the opposite.
14 The fares for hauls west of Chicago (generally longer hauls) average 7.70 per plane-mile
while the level is 7.50 per plane-mile in the markets east of Chicago. American Aviation, July 1963,
p. 27. But cf. CAB Press Release No. 63-62, 17 Oct. 1963: "The fare increases proposed by Western
• . .would make the disparity in yields between western markets and other domestic markets even
greater than they are at present." This is a departure from prior claimed ignorance of the differ-
ential, but since Western's routes are confined to the western half of the United States (reaching
no farther east than Minneapolis) and it has less competition than most carriers, the question of the
differential really was not in issue.
"5 Thus, for example, Continental Air Lines' initial attempts to introduce economy service met
with an unfavorable response. See Continental Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos. 13163, 13177,
13182, 13184, 13187, 13188, 13191 and 13195, CAB Order No. E-17756 (22 Nov. 1961) (in-
vestigating and suspending economy fare proposal and related defensive filings).
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and adopts policies under which efficiency cannot be fully reflected and
may well be discouraged by the maintenance of high price levels. Such an
approach looks to "the simultaneous maximization of things that probably
cannot be simultaneously maximized."" The public interest factor is ex-
pressed as little more than the certification of some number of carriers-
herein of "balanced competition"-with little concern for the potential
results of such action."'
Where the issue is one of fares, Board decisions reflect this same attitude.
The public interest is defined as the maximization of industry-wide profits
without placing any carrier in jeopardy. Politically, this definition would
seem to be required, for industry-wide profit is the most obvious, although
hardly the most reliable, index for determining whether the agency is
doing a good job. This is particularly true when the agency is called upon
to defend its annual request for subsidy appropriations and is faced with
pressures for subsidy reduction.
If, however, such an approach was justifiable in a period long since past,
it is nonetheless indictable for its masquerade as the promotion of competi-
tion or the avoidance of discriminatory pricing. If one accepts the indus-
try-wide view as valid, then the Board's treatment of carrier pricing
proposals, aside from the misuse of the term "discrimination," has been
satisfactory. However, any such conception of the Board's role as manager
of an industry fails to consider the economics of air transportation and
the changes which have occurred in the course of the industry's develop-
ment.
So long as the industry-wide view remains, the criteria for determining
whether a particular pricing technique is desirable are limited to those
which test the ability of each carrier to emulate the proposal profitably.
The thesis of this study, however, is that the airline industry has reached
a stage of development where emulation i's no longer the only avenue for
meeting competition successfully. If this assertion is correct, the industry-
wide view fostered by the Board's managerial philosophy is no longer an
adequate or desirable basis for price regulation.
B. Early Pricing Practices In Air Transportation
During the early phases of an industry, high developmental costs usually
result in pricing which bears little relation to production costs. The wide-
spread reluctance of the general public to fly," coupled with the guar-
antee of government subsidy, encouraged pricing practices designed to
attract traffic and simply "go as far as possible in covering costs."'" A few
attempts at creative rate-making may be found, but, in general, they had
limited competition effect and were ignored by the CAB.
96 Caves 126-27.
"T The CAB pays great attention to the competitive effect of additional certification vis-a-vis
increased frequencies, traffic stimulation and ensuring adequate service. But beyond two carriers,
little is gained in these regards. See generally Gill & Bates, Airline Competition-A Study of the
Effects of Competition on the Quality and Price of Airline Service and the Self-Sufficiency of the
United States Domestic Airlines (1949).
9' See Jones & Davis, The "Air Coach" Experiment and National Transportation Policy, 17
J. Air L. & Corn. 1, 3 (1950).
"' Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 418.
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[D]irect regulatory attainment of reasonable and non-discriminatory com-
mercial rates was not conceived to be one of the primary tasks of the Board,
nor did this issue assume any great significance in the period immediately
following the enactment of the [Civil Aeronautics Act]."'
Nevertheless, the few cases dealt with by the Board are particularly inter-
esting. They represent the first reactions to pricing schemes which attempted
to have fares reflect differences in market factors, carrier operating char-
acteristics and cost differences. However, the Board's treatment of these
questions can be explained wholly on the basis of their revenue and sub-
sidy effects, rather than as an attempt to define allowable pricing tech-
niques.
1. Premium and Discount Pricing
Beginning in 1933, American Airlines' predecessor had sold script cou-
pons with a face value of 250 dollars at a discount price of 212.50 dol-
lars.' ' Sleeper service was priced at a minor premium, varying from carrier
to carrier depending on the aircraft it used. Modification of the standard
DC-3 to the sleeper-type DST reduced capacity by one-third. The prem-
ium, however, was set at only eight per cent.' 2 It is conceivable that this
"discrimination" could have been justified by examining the actual traffic
density to determine if the seat reduction actually displaced DC-3 revenue
passengers. Apparently, no such data was considered, but it is interesting
to note that following World War II, when demand had risen consider-
ably, American priced this same service at fifty-seven per cent premium. 3
United Air Lines experimented with a low-fare "Sky-Coach" service,
designed to increase the attractiveness of its inferior Boeing 247-D equip-
ment which it was forced to operate in some markets because of ill-
equipped airports and poor traffic."0 4 It operated DC-3 equipment non-
stop between Los Angeles and San Francisco, in competition with Trans
World Airlines (TWA). Intermediate airports could not handle DC-3
equipment, nor could they support any service without a base of Los
Angeles-San Francisco through traffic. The justification for a fare differ-
ential for terminal-to-terminal passengers using the inferior service and
for denying this differential to passengers originating or terminating at
one of the intermediate points is obvious. TWA requested suspension of
the tariff, but evidently the Board ignored the complaint and United's
plan went into effect without comment.'
Thus, in at least three instances, the CAB had an opportunity to deal
with rate structure issues, if only to voice approval of an approach which
based fares on a sound conception of the alternatives available to the
0 Keyes, Passenger Fare Policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 18 J. Air L. & Com. 46 (1951).
O' Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242, 248 (1942). American later
switched to credit cards with the same discount, the forerunner of the Air Travel Plan.
112 Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 142 n. 10.
... Ibid. This may also have been a device to "re-train" the public and orient them to daylight
transcontinental flights.
'o' Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt (now Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt),
Corporate and Legal History of United Air Lines 573-74 (1953) [hereinafter cited as History of
United Air Lines].
'05 There is no recorded CAB order on the tariff. TWA's complaint is noted in History of
United Air Lines 574.
[Vol. 31
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
carrier.' Just as in Western Air Express Corporation-Mail Rates, " its
concern seemed to be limited to whether or not schemes would increase,
rather than re-allocate, revenue.
2. The Air Travel Plan
The Air Travel Plan (ATP) was the focus of the first full-dress investi-
gation of air carrier rate structures undertaken by the CAB. 8 Under the
plan, eight of the then eighteen trunkline carriers entered into contracts
with consumers of air transportation, offering them a 15 per cent dis-
count on air travel, provided a minimum of 300 dollars worth of trans-
portation was purchased annually and a deposit of 425 dollars was main-
tained. °9 All eighteen carriers honored the card on these terms, the ten
non-contracting lines being "non-issuing participants."
One feature of the plan, put in issue by TWA," was clearly anti-
competitive in design. It prevented participating carriers from contracting
with subscribers already under contract with another carrier. Hence, since
all billing, both on-line and interline, was done by the first contracting
party, it could "check" on its subscribers' use of competing services and
focus sales pressure on them. This provision was struck down by the
Board."'
Apparently, the pressure for the investigation stemmed from pressures
by travel agents who lost their sales commissions when ticketing ATP
subscribers."' The Board, however, argued that the plan stimulated the
use of air transportation"' and increased revenue. Indeed, with the savings
from agency commissions and the fact that the 15 per cent discount was
applied to one-way fares rather than to the already discounted round-
trip rate, the Board suggested that ATP rates probably saved the carriers
a good deal of money.""
Having found these facts, the Board then turns to the question of "dis-
crimination":
Considering the impetus that subscribers have given to the development of
air transportation . . . a classification of this character does not appear to
result in unjust or unreasonable rates."'
Looking for the widest possible support for this bold assertion, the Board
quotes the Supreme Court in Texas & Pac. R.R. v. ICC:
"0 See discussion in text following note 82 supra. Of course, American's scrip plan might not
necessarily represent a choice of alternatives by the carrier.
107 Supra note 83.
' Air Passenger Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
109Cf. Passenger Credit Plans Investigation, CAB Docket No. 10917, CAB Order No. E-19197
(16 Jan. 1963), remanded for reopened hearings and modified sub nom. Reopened Passenger Credit
Plans Investigation, CAB Docket No. 10917, CAB Order No. E-20280 (19 Dec. 1963).
"o 3 C.A.B. at 247. See also, Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 470.
"' 3 C.A.B. at 252.
"' Id. at 247.
a.s Id. at 249. To support this, the Board cited the fact that (1) the number of subscribers
had risen; (2) the number of ATP cards issued had risen; and (3) the average monthly billing
to subscribers was $216.00. These facts alone prove nothing. No comparison was made with overall
traffic growth.
"
4 id. at 250.
11" Ibid.
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[A]ll circumstances and conditions which reasonable men would regard as
affecting the welfare of the carrying companies, and of the producers, shippers
and consumers should be considered by a tribunal .... l
The Board concludes by noting that there is no competitive relationship
between ATP subscribers and non-subscribers and that "the reduced rates
are reasonably open to all. .........
Thus, one is left in the dark as to "discrimination." The plan is possibly
non-discriminatory, since it is open to anyone and does not push non-ATP
rates up beyond a "zone of reasonableness" (a view consistent with this
study's approach); or, the "discrimination" is justified either because it
stimulates traffic, because volume air transportation is a "different product"
than flight-by-flight transportation (despite the lack of differences in
ticketing cost and service); or, because the absence of a "competitive
relationship" between consumers makes rates based on differential elasticity
of demand permissible. With all eighteen carriers participating, no ques-
tion of inter-carrier competition was involved. The Board's primary con-
cern seems to have been with maximizing industry-wide revenue. "Dis-
crimination" is subordinate to this concern and, arguably, the inquiry was
designed simply to give the policy determination a gloss of legalistic equity.
This analysis is supported by the Board's action shortly thereafter, per-
mitting carriers to eliminate all discounts, including the Air Travel Plan.1 '
Given the high demand for airline space during the war,"' the action
increased carrier revenues by some ten per cent. No consideration was
given the possibility that this modification of the rate structure might have
been an instance of "discrimination."'
12
0
Following the war, carriers again filed a Universal Air Travel Plan
(UATP) tariff, this time with a five per cent discount. Air travel had
become an accepted mode of transport and some were already expressing
fears that carriers' planning for the post-war period was overly optimistic.
The Board suspended the discount feature and docketed the matter for
investigation, 1 but the discount was cancelled before investigation."'
3. The Treatment of Rate Relationships
Following the original ATP decision, rate relationships underwent their
first major alteration. Again, the changes were the incidental result of
the Board's concern with industry revenue. While wartime demand yielded
profitable operations, the Board was undoubtedly embarrassed by the fact
that the highly competitive carriers, whose unit revenues were from ten
to twenty per cent higher than carriers with little route competition,
were charging a higher level of fares than other lines.m' In a show-cause
"i 162 U.S. 197, 219 (1896).
117 3 C.A.B. at 251.
118 See Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 409.
s" See History of United Air Lines 570.
150 This is not to suggest that the change or resulting rate structure should be classed as a dis-
crimination. Given thorough examination, probably it is not. However, it is clear that the CAB
was not concerned with pricing techniques in a revenue-increasing setting.
121 Universal Air Travel Plan Case, CAB Docket No. 1939, CAB Order No. 3763 (23 June
1945) (order instituting investigation).
:2 History of United Air Lines 571.
"' Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 447.
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order directed to eleven of the carriers," the Board proposed a blanket
ten per cent reduction in fares.
The "Big Four" carriers (American, Eastern, TWA, and United)
opposed this order, proposing instead specific reductions with a view to
obtaining uniform per-mile rates over their systems."' Their support of
a uniform base-rate, however, came not from any conception of "dis-
criminatory" or differential pricing (in which systemwide uniformity
could be looked upon as non-discriminatory or as a justified discrimina-
tion). Rather, their highest fares being in competitive markets,2 6 they
sought to avoid application of any reduction to their lower non-competi-
tive market fares.'
2 7
CAB-carrier compromises, predicated on the adoption of uniform base
rates, obviated the need for investigation and produced a four per cent
drop in the general fare level."' Thus, the fare decreases occurred princi-
pally in competitive, dense markets, other carriers meeting the Big Four
rate when necessary.
One cannot take issue with the result insofar as we would expect com-
petitive rates to be below non-competitive rates (or at least not above
them) and, given the high level of demand and profitability in almost all
sectors, uniformity appears to be within a "zone of reasonableness." The
willingness of the Board to accept the compromise and drop its plans for
investigation seems to have stemmed more from a concern with subsidy
than with pricing techniques.
A little over a year later, the Board issued a new set of show-cause
orders, directed at the relation between subsidy and fare levels."' The
presence of a uniform base-rate among the Big Four made it appear
equitable to calculate mail-pay on the same basis. Thus, passenger fares
and mail rates were reduced to a common level at forty-five cents per
ton-mile' and the Board was able to claim that it had effectively elimi-
nated the subsidy component from the Big Four's mail-pay.''
CAB attitudes have thus directed air carrier management toward pricing
techniques which will increase net revenue and away from rate structure
"4 American Airlines, Inc. et al., CAB Docket No. 850, CAB Order No. 2164 (27 Feb. 1943)
(order to show cause in the matter of rates, fares and other charges for transportation of pas-
sengers).
"' See, e.g., History of United Air Lines 540.
" Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 450.
"z The uniform base rate approach might have been justified at the time in question since al-
most all carriers were operating DC-3 aircraft in all markets (80.7% of commercial trunkline air-
craft were DC-3s) and direct operating costs were much less varied than they are today with long
non-stop stage lengths and different aircraft types.
' Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 409-10.
""American Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 1698, CAB Order No. 3351 (22 Dec. 1944)
(order to show cause-systemwide mail rates); Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 1697,
CAB Order No. 3350 (22 Dec. 1944); Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., CAB Docket No.
1700, CAB Order No. 3353 (22 Dec. 1944); and United Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 1699,
CAB Order No. 3352 (22 Dec. 1944). Unlike the 1943 show cause order, note 124 supra, these
orders led to actual adjudications. See American Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 567 (1945);
Eastern Ar Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 551 (1945); Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,
Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 595 (1945); and United Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 6 C.A.B. 581 (1945).
... Gill & Bates, op. cit. supra note 97, at 411.
sa' The claim is far less valid than it sounds for it assumes that the cost of transporting pas-
sengers and mail is equal.
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proposals which would increase a single carrier's profit, efficiency or com-
petitive position at the same net revenue level or at a lower unit revenue
level."8 2 The efficacy of promotional fares or discounts, while argued in
terms of discrimination, is keyed wholly to questions of maintaining the
general fare level.'
Although some significant steps away from this position have been
taken (and will be noted infra), the elimination of direct subsidy for
trunkline carriers and other developments have not altered this general
attitude. Thus, in the course of approving a general fare increase in 1960,
the Board noted that "the higher level of fares should afford sufficient
financial latitude to enable the industry to experiment with promotional
fares.. ,,."" However, later in the same year, the CAB's concern with the
industry profit rate led to approval, without a formal investigation, of an
increase in jet coach fares.1 ' No consideration was given to the possibility
of narrowing the first-class/coach differential by other means nor to the
cost differential between classes. 3 ' The recent reduction in first-class fares
was similarly predicated on the requirement that carriers reduce the family
fare discount and minimize first-class lounge space... attempting thereby
to safeguard industry revenue levels.
C. Administrative Regulation And The Egalitarian Ethic
As many theorists have observed, governmental action in economic
regulation through legislation is shaped, as a political phenomenon, by
egalitarian pressures. In administrative action, the egalitarian ethic is
no less effective as an institutional phenomenon. The regulation of equals
is inherently easier. Hence, a regulated industry is faced with continued
pressure for homogeneity. The sections which follow explore the ways
in which references to price discrimination are used to avoid regulatory
problems which would arise if the assumption of homogeneity were dis-
carded and a multi-dimensional approach recognizing the non-equality
of all carriers were substituted.
132 Keyes, Passenger Fare Policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 18 J. Air L. & Com. 46, 60
(1951).
138 Thus, as the demand created by the war slackened and costs increased, the rate structure
underwent a series of revenue-seeking gyrations without much concern for rate relationships. Uni-
form base rates disappeared; new aircraft bore premium-fare tariffs (and older aircraft were held
to no-discount fares, see, e.g., States-Alaska Fare Case, 21 C.A.B. 354 (1955)); general fare in-
creases coupled with elimination of premium fares, reintroduction of discounts and changes in dis-
count features were generally approved without much comment. See generally, Gill & Bates, op. cit.
supra note 97, at 458-76.
" Domestic Trunkline Passenger Fare Increases, 31 C.A.B. 984 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
". See CAB Order No. E-15894 (7 Oct. 1960).
"" See Caves 166. However, the next time around, the CAB refused to permit another coach
increase. Its apparent lack of interest in the overall question of rate relationships, however, was still
present. It ignored other features of the proposed tariff which involved varying applications of
dollar amount increases and dollar plus percentage increases by both aircraft (piston or jet) and
class, thus introducing a distance taper and, to the extent that piston craft were being operated
in certain markets because traffic was insufficient to support jet service, a density-operating cost
integration as well. Instead, the CAB announced that it would view a flat 3% general increase
favorably. See United Air Lines (proposed passenger fares), CAB Docket No. 13313, CAB Order
No. E-17885 (28 Dec. 1961); 1A Av. L. Rep. 21,236 at 14684.
" See CAB Press Release No. 63-92, 20 Dec. 1963.
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1. The Avoidance of Product or Market Definitions
One aspect of the pressure for homogeneity is reflected in decisions on
pricing technique and "discrimination" which ignore the necessity of
defining the market or the products involved in clear terms.
For example the Board's two decisions in Capital Group Student Fares...
failed to consider Capital's proposal in the light of its route structure or
the traffic it was seeking to develop. The majority of Capital's routes and
flight patterns were keyed to Washington, D.C. While its proposal was
theoretically applicable throughout the system, it is clear that Capital
assumed that the tariff would have its greatest application (indeed, its
only significant application) in the Washington market among school
groups visiting the city. The tariff was applicable only on Saturdays and
Tuesdays, its historic "weak traffic" days in the Washington market.
While Capital competed for Washington traffic in a number of dense
city-pairs (e.g., Chicago-Washington, Detroit-Washington), many of its
Washington pairs were non-competitive and, in any case, the route struc-
tures of its competitors were not wholly dependent on Washington traffic.
Had the market and product been defined this way, it would have been
apparent that Capital was attempting to sell a marginal-cost product in
a geographically limited market.
The carrier is to blame for its failure to support the filing with cost
data.'3 ' The Board, however, was willing to reverse its examiner's finding
that the excursion fare itself was discriminatory. It singled out the "stu-
dent" restriction as an unjust discrimination.14' Once the relevant market
is considered, the approval sans restriction is meaningless-the fare will be
effectively utilized only by student groups. 4'
On the other hand, there are instances where ignorance of the relevant
market characteristics and the consequent application of a "rule against
discrimination" in vacuuo makes the fare proposal seem absurd. Thus the
Board recently suspended and ordered investigation of a proposal by
Mohawk Airlines' focusing on the possible discriminatory nature of a
40 per cent discount to certain university students traveling between
Buffalo, Ithaca, Rochester or Syracuse and New York/Newark on speci-
fied dates. While Mohawk submitted an excellent statement justifying its
proposal on market and operating characteristics, the Board bluntly stated
that "such allegations do not justify the discrimination inherent [in the
18s Capital Group Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280 (1957) (disapproving student feature but
proposing remand to examiner if carrier agrees to delete student requirement) and Capital Group
Student Fares, 26 C.A.B. 451 (1958) (approving tariff with deletion; ignoring factors relating to
price differential). See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
In Given the fact that the Board ended up ignoring cost data of a more elementary sort, see
text accompanying note 85 supra, some part of the blame must be laid to the CAB itself. See dis-
cussion in text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
14 Capital Group Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280, 281 (1957). Cf. the Board's treatment of
"youth" fares in text accompanying note 240 infra, in which "student" becomes "ages 12-22."
"41 If Capital was, as suggested here, basically seeking to tap the "school trip to Washington"
market, there would be additional savings to the extent that student groups would be likely to
"repeat" each year and past the initial sales development, little selling cost would be involved. If
so, approval of the tariff without the student restriction at the same proposed rate is open to
question.
" Reduced Fares for Students Proposed by Mohawk Airlines, CAB Docket No. 15949, CAB
Order No. E-21912 (16 March 1965),
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student restriction of the proposal] ."s Given this response, Mohawk can-
celled the tariff revision and the investigation was dismissed.'"
Briefly, Mohawk was seeking a solution to the student practice of making
multiple reservations during peak holiday travel periods. The damage in-
flicted on Mohawk is undoubtedly heightened by the fact that the uni-
versity communities it serves are located at its major traffic points. Accord-
ingly, Mohawk conceived of a plan whereby students at such institutions
would be given a discount if tickets were issued at least ten days prior to
the date of departure. If presented for refund during the week before
departure, no refund would be made."' The fare, of course, would be
applicable only during the peak travel periods.
Since the tariff revision is based on these specific factors, the Board's
assertion that the student restriction is a discrimination of such magnitude
as to outweigh any other consideration is plain folly. The specifics raised
by Mohawk are precisely what make the students the relevant group. Con-
sideration of the proposal without reference to students would not only
suggest an even greater potential for discrimination but would look like
irrational pricing, which, as noted supra,' might force other carriers to
follow suit. As it was, no trunkline carrier competing in the markets in-
volved objected to Mohawk's plan. Since each trunkline had sources of
revenue beyond Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse, elimination of multiple
reservations would be highly beneficial to them, opening seats for long-
haul passengers and thereby compensating for any revenue loss from stu-
dent diversion to Mohawk. By avoiding any market definition, this effect
is ignored. The proposal is evaluated in terms of all markets and all
carriers and, accordingly, the matter of "discrimination" assumes different
proportions.
This same attitude is revealed in the Capital Family-Plan Case.147 Here,
Capital supported its proposal to extend its family-fare plan to Saturdays
by producing data indicating that, owing to its route structure, it carried
26.8 per cent less traffic on Saturdays than on other days.1
4
1
The CAB examiner concluded that Capital's proposal was unjustly dis-
criminatory, since, if each carrier could extend the family fare to its
lowest fare day, competition would make the family fare applicable on
all days of the week, the supposed "leveling" effect on traffic would be
eliminated.14 No consideration was given to the fact that, owing to the
routes of other carriers, their lowest fare days were already covered by
the middle-of-the-week family plan. The Board reversed, stating that it
was not prepared to pass on the discrimination issue until after a broader
14" Ibid.
'44Reduced Fares for Students Proposed by Mohawk Airlines, CAB Docket No. 15949, CAB
Order No. E-22094 (29 April 1965).
1" This would seem to be the only feature of the proposed tariff legitimately open to question,
insofar as it establishes a 100% penalty. However, the Board had standards for such penalties from
the abortive "no-show" plan. Hence, had it wanted to allow the tariff to go into effect, it could
have stipulated a lower penalty pending investigation.
'"See text preceding note 72 supra.
14726 C.A.B. 8 (1917).




family fare investigation."' It noted, however, that "If it should develop
that Capital's Saturday family fare plan has a significant weakening effect
on other carriers, we can re-examine the reasonableness of the plan.. .. "151
CAB member Harmar Denny, dissenting, was more explicit, stating that
he considered "that both Capital and the industry would suffer a severe
loss."'' . However, Capital's competitors found no reason to emulate the
Saturday plan 53 and the proposed investigation was dropped. Experiences
of this sort apparently have had no effect on the Board's attitudes. The
assumption of automatic emulation continues to serve as the justification
for an industry-wide approach.
The lack of market or product definition does more than ignore pertinent
data. It leaves "discrimination" without a well-defined object. In the
recent Delta Off-Peak. Coach Case,' Delta sought the right to apply its
normal coach fare to seating in both coach and first-class compartments
of Convair 880 aircraft departing San Francisco for Dallas between the
hours of 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. Its competitor in the market, American,
objected. In finding the Delta proposal to be discriminatory, the Board
advanced a multitude of supposed discriminations. Thus, the fare in-
volved would discriminate between passengers on the flight in question;
between coach passengers on daytime flights and passengers on the flight
in question;15' between coach passengers on Delta's flights in other markets
and passengers on this flight;".. and would be a discrimination against
American's passengers as well."'
An examination of the facts which prompted Delta to make this pro-
posal indicates the absurdity of these conclusions. As the dissent notes,
Delta's Convair 880 aircraft were purchased primarily for other services
prior to its extension from Atlanta to the West Coast via Dallas."' The air-
craft is smaller than American's Boeing 707 equipment"' and bears a
heavy proportion of first-class to coach seats. Delta was thus forced to
turn away potential coach passengers while flying with its first-class com-
partment partially empty. American had no such problem, owing to its
larger craft and greater proportion of coach seating. Delta was not pro-
posing to maintain first-class services while up-grading selected passengers
to the first-class compartment. It sought to eliminate first-class amenities,
save the seating, and offer the entire capacity at coach fare on a first-come,
first-served basis. Given its particular situation, the coach revenue to be
150 Id. at 9.
'"Id. at 13.
112 Id. at 1 5 (dissenting opinion).
... See Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey and Analysis-Il, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 148, 154 (1958).
"
4 CAB Docket No. 13040, CAB Order No. E-20268 (16 Dec. 1963).
Id. at 2, 10.
'5 Id. at 2-4.
1"71d. at 8-10.
158Id., p. 8 (separately numbered dissenting opinion). See Southern Transcontinental Service
Case, 33 C.A.B. 701 (1961).
15 The Convair 880s operated by Delta had an average seating capacity of 89.1 passengers, while
American's Boeing 720s averaged 106.1 and its 707s 123.5. American Aviation, July 1963, p. 43.
More importantly, the Convair's narrow cabin accommodates only five coach seats, as opposed to
six in other aircraft.
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gained more than offset any loss from eliminating first-class service.
American's situation was hardly similar and it is therefore doubtful that
it would have found any competitive necessity to adjust its policies in kind.
The Board's finding of discrimination between American and Delta
passengers rests on the assumption that these services are comparable. To
support this, it notes that the Delta departure time is not "off-peak," since
it attracts a substantial amount of the intercity traffic. This ignores the
fact that American, when it was the sole carrier in the market, provided
its only quality service late in the evening, shaping consumer habits. '°
Moreover, San Francisco is the terminus for a number of American's flight
patterns. Thus it has several alternatives in utilizing aircraft late at night.
Delta, on the other hand, enters San Francisco on but one route and must
choose between operating as at present or moving the departure time to
9:00 a.m. with an attendant loss of utilization."' Since Delta's primary
routes are in the eastern half of the nation, its equipment is more useful
in Atlanta than in San Francisco during daylight hours. Thus, Delta's
nighttime flights from San Francisco are qualitatively different from its
daytime flights. The same cannot be said for American. Moreover, the
product produced by Delta's night flight is "off-peak" in an operational
sense, even if the departure time may not be off-peak for passengers.
The Board also ignores the fact that, unlike American's service, Delta's
flight continues to Atlanta, which, in terms of departure-time preference,
is certainly off-peak. The result is that a passenger in the first-class com-
partment pays the first-class fare to Dallas, but is charged a reduced fare
for the same accommodations between Dallas and Atlanta, a non-
competitive market."
Such anomalies occur when the Board ignores the role of variations in
carrier resources and operations and attempts to make pricing decisions
under an assumption of uniformity. Once these variations are recognized,
the argument that proposals must be tested under the assumption that
each carrier will emulate the policies of the other becomes untenable. '
Under the definition of unjust discrimination heretofore advanced, neither
of Capital's proposals, nor Mohawk's and Delta's schemes should be labeled
"discriminatory." They are functionally available to all (or to a sig-
nificant group) and the particular characteristics of the carrier support
the creation of the distinction.
2. The Use of Different Standards in Competitive and Non-Competitive
Cases
Operating under the industry-wide approach, the Board's conception
of price discrimination is radically different where intermodal rather than
160 Delta Off-Peak Coach Case, supra note 154, at 3-4. (separately numbered dissenting opinion).
,6 Id. at 9.
'" See Official Airline Guide, February 1964. Delta has since changed its operating pattern,
overflying Dallas and flying nonstop to Atlanta, Dallas being served on a multi-stop San Francisco-
New Orleans service. The introduction of the nonstop flight changes the conditions sufficiently to
warrant maintenance of the regular first/coach rate structure.
A pattern of non-emulative responses is discussed in text accompanying notes 277-88 intra
(1957-58 strategies in the transcontinental market).
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intramodal relationships are involved, or where factors outside of the
agency's control come into play.
a. The Treatment of Surface Carrier Competition-Thus, the practice
of common-faring all West Coast cities (San Diego, Los Angeles, Port-
land, Seattle, etc.) for traffic from the east and middle west is justified,
in part, by the railroad practice.1" No consideration is given to the possi-
bility that the comparative levels of rail and air rates (as well as other
factors) may make the competitive advantage secured by the practice de
minimis. Similarly, the Board reversed an examiner's finding that common-
faring Portland and Seattle with respect to Alaska traffic was discrimina-
tory,' but accepted his conclusion that common-faring Alaska cities was
to be proscribed."' The Board noted that water carriers followed the first
practice;... common-faring Alaska points, on the other hand, was related
to intramodal competition.
In Investigation of Braniff Airways Excursion Fares,"'s the Board heeded
protestations by Eastern, and Braniff's original proposal was modified."'
The theory of an excursion fare, however, was maintained, arguably in
response to the argument that
air fares in southern Texas are too high for effective competition with sur-
face transportation, and therefore the solution to [the] problem of lean
traffic is to be found in lower fares.7 0
When Examiner Edward T. Stodola indicated that surface competition was
not relevant in justifying a ten per cent discount for military traffic, the
Board was quick to dispel the doubt 7. and reverse. Similarly, in the Free
and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case,17 1 discounts for travel agents were
held discriminatory in domestic travel but justifiable in international trans-
portation where the practice was common among shipping lines.1 74
b. Balancing "Competition" Between CAB-Regulated Carriers-As the
Board's actions in Braniff Excursion Fares and Pacific Northwest-Alaska
(the common-fare case) suggest, "discrimination" is no more than a dis-
tinction between competition the CAB wishes to allow and that which it
finds undesirable. In National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case,7'
Eastern attempted to prevent introduction of daylight coach service in
the New York-Miami market. The Board, while refusing to accept
Examiner R. Vernon Radcliffe's conclusion that discrimination was im-
14 West Coast Common Fares Case, 15 C.A.B. 90, 92 (1952).
165 Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903 (1953).
1" Id. at 907, 930 (examiner's initial decision).
16
7 Id. at 905.
1" 12 C.A.B. 227 (1950).
16sId. at 231.170 Id. at 228.
171 Certificated Air Carrier Military-Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902 (1959).
172 Id. at 905, 907.
173 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
174 As one would expect, representatives of competing modes of transportation gain little by
complaints to the CAB. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos. 15925, 15983, 16025
and 16026, CAB Order Nos. E-22068 (22 April 1965) and E-22186 (20 May 1965) (concerning
complaint by National Trailways Bus System); Eastern Airlines, Extension of Air-Bus Fares (Com-
plaint of the National Association of Motor Bus Owners), 33 C.A.B. 1033 (1961); ATC Fare Dis-
counts, 29 C.A.B. 1344 (1959).
175 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951).
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possible since space on the flight was "offered to all at the same fare,""'
approved the tariff on the finding that the daycoach service was sufficiently
different from first-class to pass muster under the "like and contemporane-
ous" rule.
What passed unnoticed in Daylight Coach was the fact that National
apparently based its fare reduction on factors in addition to the increased
density of aircoach seating. At a 75 per cent load factor, its 58 dollar fare
represents a reduction of over 6.50 dollars beyond the reduction occasioned
by increased capacity.' Apparently, part of this reduction stemmed from
National's substitution of the true New York-Miami mileage on a "Great
Circle" route for the circuitous "all-stop" mileage previously used in rate
construction.' Thus, National's tariff threatened to undermine Eastern's
entire all-stop structure and break its Miami fares constructed with gate-
ways other than New York. The examiner's references to this problem are
oblique,'79 and he carefully includes a general "policy" statement indicating
the efficacy of allowing more freedom to price as the industry's financial
position improves.' Had he pointed up the anti-discrimination aspects of
National's approach, the Board's per curiam type approval of the tariff
'
76 Id. at 332.
1' The capacities and fares are set out in the examiner's initial decision, id. at 334. The $6.50
figure is arrived at by calculating revenue for each service at a 75% load factor and applying the
difference from the first-class revenue yield per seat to the number of coach passengers at a 75%
load. National's reduction would seem to be opposite to the general trend which has been to price
coach accommodations at a level where they yield higher plane-load revenue.
171 See Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries, Hearings, supra note 38, at 2206 (testimony
of Alexander G. Hardy, Senior Vice-President, National Airlines). The entire question of all-stop
mileage as the figure for rate calculation has been generally ignored by the Board, although it is
noted in CAB, Bureau of Air Operations, Rates Division, Commercial Rates Section, Preliminary
Report on Domestic Passenger Fare Structure, June 7, 1954, in Monopoly Problems in Regulated
Industries, Hearings, supra Vol. 1, p. 221 at 232-33. See generally, Gill & Bates, Airline Competi-
tion-A Study of the Effects of Competition on the Quality and Price of Airline Service and the
Self-Sufficiency of the United States Domestic Airlines 400-08 (1949). By applying circuitous
all-stop mileage, the fare per nonstop mile charged varies because of the vagaries of the carrier's
certificate without regard to cost, density, or other rational factors. Hence Gill & Bates found that
Eastern Air Lines' per nonstop mile fare between Louisville and Chattanooga was almost 20%
higher than the fare for a similar haul between Louisville and Chicago. In the latter instance, the
intermediate certificated point was Indianapolis, with almost no circuity; in the former instance,
Nashville, with 49 miles circuity, was the intermediate. Of course, all-stop mileage may be par-
tially justified as a device for obtaining a premium for the faster nonstop flight. On the other hand,
one might argue that if Chattanooga-Louisville is a thin market and operations via Nashville are thus
required, use of all-stop mileage is simply a means of allocating cost to the consumer in line with
density. If, however, this justification is to be used, some factor must be introduced which will
account for revenue produced by the stop at Nashville. One possible method is suggested by re-
versing the approach suggested by the CAB in Service to Atlantic City, supra note 80. If the cost
of downgrading a nonstop flight to a one-stop service may be expressed as circuity cost plus revenue
lost by downgrading the flight (plus station expense, etc.), is it not also possible to cost Nashville-
Louisville and Nashville-Chattanooga service which operates via the three cities by (1) including
lost revenue to the extent that a Nashville passenger cancels a possible through sale (see text ac-
companying notes 193-96 infra) or (2) if the through market is thin and space is available for
the Nashville passenger on a marginal cost basis? This should not change the fare charged the Nash-
ville passenger, however, in determining the cost of the Louisville-Nashville-Chattanooga service as
a basis for the Louisville-Chattanooga fare. The difference between marginal cost and fully-allocated
cost for each leg of the Nashville dogleg would be subtracted from the circuity cost, so that the
cost occasioned by the Nashville stop is not borne wholly by the Louisville-Chattanooga passenger
but is allocated in terms of the additional revenue thus made available to the carrier.
'. National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, supra note 175, at 341.
sO Id. at 349. See also, Gellman, supra note 153, at 152. Gellman suggests that the examiner's
"policy" statement is in fact the Board's policy. That may be true; however, it is not a conclusion
which can be drawn from this case. If the CAB were allowing carriers more "freedom" to price,
it would be looking to pricing techniques. A temporary policy of approving experimentation is not
a policy of freedom.
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would have been unlikely. As CAB Member Gurney's dissent indicates,18
the Board was, as usual, more concerned with revenue than with pricing
techniques.
The relation of "discrimination" to inter-carrier competition is further
pointed-up by two other sets of decisions. In both Pittsburgh-Philadelphia
No-Reservation Fare Investigation'2 and Frontier Rate Matter,' local
service carriers sought to institute reduced-rate "go-show" tariffs to re-
duce excess capacity. The former proposal went into effect, yet the latter
was held to be "discriminatory," the examiner noting that it could even
be considered "unfair competition." ' The result is even more curious when
one considers that the Pittsburgh-Philadelphia operation was to be nonstop
while Frontier's proposal involved multistop flights in a market served
non-stop by a trunkline carrier.
The explanation may be found in the fact that the Pittsburgh-
Philadelphia market, while served by trunklines, had trunkline frequencies
keyed to long-haul markets. Thus, Allegheny's proposal was essentially
non-competitive. Indeed, the Board explicitly pointed out that it was not
accepting any marginal cost justification for the lower rate."' The assump-
tion was that the new fare would not divert passengers from TWA or
United, but rather would promote new travel.8" Frontier's proposal, on
the other hand, was liable to have a direct effect on Western Air Lines.
Similarly, the Board recently acceeded to the request of National Air
Lines and suspended Delta's proposed routing of West Coast-Atlanta flights
via Orlando, Florida."' Delta is certificated to serve both markets from
the West Coast and clearly could have obtained better utilization of its
equipment and provided better service by combining the two services and
including additional traffic at Orlando destined for Atlanta or beyond.
The Board, however, observed that the practice would be a long-and-short-
haul discrimination, since a "jet passenger destined for Atlanta (which is
nearer to the West Coast) would pay from twelve to sixteen dollars less,
but travel 399 miles more than a passenger on the same aircraft who
deplaned at Orlando.'..8 In addition, Orlando passengers could purchase
the cheaper ticket to Atlanta and still deplane at Orlando.
... 14 C.A.B. at 333.
12 34 C.A.B. 508 (1961).
"' CAB Docket No. 14150, CAB Order Nos. E-20309 (initial decision of examiner) and
E-20310 (adopting initial decision as CAB opinion) (26 Dec. 1963). IA Av. L. Rep. 21,429
at 15167.
184 In declining review of the examiner's decision and adopting it as the CAB opinion, the Board
noted that the unfair competition finding presented a novel question which was not necessary to
the decision. Regarding the multi-stop v. nonstop issue, cf. United's early "Sky Coach" service,
text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
185Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508, 510-11, 514
(1961).
'" Id. at 515.
187CAB Press Release No. 63-59, 11 Oct. 1963. National also serves Orlando from the West
Coast.
188 Ibid. The "long and short haul" clause is found only in § 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
supra note 25, not in legislation relating to air transport. Cf. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra
note 24. Had the CAB looked 'to regulatory history, it would have found that the long and short
discrimination arose as a result of competition and particular situations, rather than having been
a technique designed to create competition, and in no case could have been justified by efficiency,
iven the characteristics of surface transport.
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This same "discrimination," however, was approved by the Board in
the Allegheny Fare Case"5 9 where the competitive impact was minimal.
Allegheny was thus able to route Washington-Hartford service via Provi-
dence, charging 26.90 dollars for the Providence trip and 23.50 dollars
for the service through Providence to Hartford. The Board noted that
"it would be impracticable for a Providence-bound passenger to check his
baggage to Hartford/Springfield and somehow thereafter reclaim it [at
Providence] . . ." in order to obtain the lower fare."'
c. Meeting the Competition of Unregulated Air Carriers-In rare in-
stances, the Board is called upon to deal with pricing practices brought
about by competition from air carriers which are beyond the Board's
regulatory reach. In such cases, consideration of "discrimination" takes a
back seat to the agency's benevolent, albeit parochial, attitude toward pro-
tecting its subjects.
An early example of this approach is found in IATA Agreement Pro-
viding for North Atlantic Passenger Fares.1' In IATA Agreement, trans-
atlantic carriers increased Gander-Europe fares by twice the increase in
the New York-Europe market. The discriminatory appearance of this
differential was held to be justified because Trans-Canada Air Line's (now
Air Canada) U.S.-Gander services had heretofore made the U.S.-Gander-
Europe interline fare lower than the transatlantic carriers' on-line fare."2
Curiously, the discrimination, if any, was probably reversed, since the
IATA cartel applied a high "over-water" per-mile rate to the total haul,
notwithstanding the fact that the Gander-U.S. sector had cost character-
istics akin to normal domestic routes.'93
This aspect of the problem is ignored by the Board, but even more
important is its failure to deal with the carriers' defense based on the
characteristics of its route. Under this approach, the higher charge for
Gander traffic is justified by the fact that Gander-U.S. was a thin market
and therefore, any Gander-Europe passenger effectively blocked a seat from
New York, displacing a potential New York-Europe sale and leaving no
revenue alternative. The Board does evaluate the loss on a passenger-mile
basis,'9 4 but ultimately, this factor plays no part in its approval 9 ' even
though a pricing technique of this type is derived from an approach the
.. Allegheny Fare Case-Proposed Routing between Hartford/Springfield and Washington, 34
C.A.B. 327 (1961).
19Id. at 334 (initial decision of examiner adopted by the Board). This impracticability is
wholly ignored in the discussion of Delta's Orlando proposal. Board policy is entirely different
with respect to cargo carriage, see Delta Air Lines, All-Cargo Flight Amendments, 14 C.A.B. 1149
(1951). Delta was allowed to carry Dallas-bound cargo via New Orleans from Atlanta, the Board
noting that the consumer could not care how the cargo went unless it involved "a higher rate or
prevent[ed] a timely delivery." Delta Air Lines, supra at 1163. Why passengers should differ in
this respect is beyond comprehension. See also, Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, EDR-15B, ODR-2,
CAB Docket Nos. 11618 and 11785, 27 March 1964, at pp. 5-7, discussing desirability of amend-
ing § 221.41(a) of the Board's Economic Regulations (14 C.F.R. § 221.41(a)) to allow carriers
to file open routing air cargo tariffs.
191 10 C.A.B. 330 (1949).
19 Id. at 335-36.
" The Board pleads that cost data is inexact, id. at 338, however, it did note that TCA was
able to base its charges on its average domestic cost, id. at 335
19 Id. at 334.
199 Approval was conditioned on the continued existence of TCA's present fare, Id. at 339,
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Board itself suggested in the early Service to Atlantic City case.'"
A more recent, and certainly more outrageous, example of CAB incon-
sistency in applying its rules against "discrimination" is found in a com-
parison of the Board's treatment of competitive strategies in the Los
Angeles-Las Vegas market (where all carriers are subject to CAB regula-
tion) and the Los Angeles-San Francisco market (in which Pacific South-
west Airlines, an intrastate air carrier, is a potent force).
In order to meet PSA's competition, United and Western, the major
regulated competitors in the market, set "jet commuter" fares of 13.50
dollars. TWA, the other trunkline in the market, proposed a similar re-
duction in its Los Angeles-San Francisco fare, applicable, however, to
dual-configured aircraft."' In opposition, Western filed a complaint with
the Board, charging that TWA's reduction was unjustified because it
was not restricted to high-density aircraft and would be part of a through
service rather than the turnaround service which Western and United
are able to provide. In this instance, the Board felt it unnecessary to in-
volve itself in questions such as the allowable seat-pitch and the use of
the identical seat as a coach seat in one market and a reduced-fare in
another. ' It dismissed Western's complaint on the basis that TWA was
"meeting competition.' ' 9
Of course, if the Board had wanted to delve deeper into the problem,
it would have found that Western's argument was unsound. Competition
aside, TWA's proposed fare and its use of dual-configured aircraft are
justifiable for the reasons which Western asserts demonstrate its unreason-
ableness. Since Los Angeles-San Francisco is TWA's only West Coast route,
and it cannot operate turnaround service, the marginal cost of its excess
capacity between those cities is extremely low. Competitively, the effect
on Western or United will be minimal, since TWA will only fly between
Los Angeles and San Francisco when doing so is justified by its beyond
Los Angeles traffic or by its pattern of equipment utilization. If TWA is
required to operate in that market with high density aircraft which it
cannot use in its through services, all possible benefit to it is lost. Had
the CAB in fact engaged in such an analysis, they would have been hard-
pressed to justify their concern over seating density and economic practi-
cality with respect to United's contemporaneous proposal for the Los
Angeles-Las Vegas market.' 5
'" Supra note 80.
19'Trans World Airlines, Inc. (jet commuter fare decrease), CAB Docket No. 15939, CAB
Order No. E-21957 (29 March 1965). Sixty days before, when TWA first established jet com-
muter fares, it additionally filed a tariff for a ten-trip ninety-day commuter ticket at a 5% dis-
count. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. (jet commuter fares), CAB Docket No. 15805, CAB Order
No. E-21767 (8 Feb. 1965). See also, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (reduced jet coach fares), CAB
Docket No. 16021, CAB Order No. E-22053 (19 April 1965) (reducing jet coach fares in the
Los Angeles-San Francisco market by 34.6%, from $23.70 to $15.50).
'" In general, the Board's concern with seat-pitch must result in more discrimination to the
carriers than any possible injury to the consumers. One doubts that the average consumer is really
sensitive to the differences between 34 inches, 35-Y2 inches, or 37 inches.
"'This, of course, must be the competition of PSA, rather than United or Western, since
United and Western reduced their fares in response to PSA.
" United Air Lines, Inc. (propeller commuter fare between Los Angeles and Las Vegas), CAB
Docket No. 15996, CAB Order No. E-21958 (29 March 1965).
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Aside from the absence of an unregulated carrier, the situation in the
Los Angeles-Las Vegas market appears to be comparable to Los Angeles-
San Francisco. Western operates multiple-frequency DC- 6B commuter
services at 11.43 dollars each way. Bonanza, a local service carrier, operates
a "budget-aire" service at 13 dollars in modern, jet-prop F-27 equipment.
United sought approval to meet Western's 11.43 dollars fare with DC-6
aircraft.20 ' The United DC-6 however, would seat 69 persons four-abreast,
whereas Western's DC-6Bs were configured five-abreast, seating 87-92
passengers. Upon complaints by Western and Bonanza, the United pro-
posal was suspended and set for investigation,"' the order pointing out
that four-abreast service meant upgrading the service at the same rate,
thereby undermining the basis upon which Western's low-fare proposal
was approved. Seeking reconsideration, United stated that it would re-
frain from any advertising of the four-abreast feature, making any com-
petitive advantage minimal. The Board, denying United's petition, specified
a 13 dollar fare (i.e., the same fare as applicable to jet and jet-prop com-
muter service) as the minimum it would consider." 3 In the face of this
pre-investigation determination, United cancelled its proposed tariff re-
vision.'
The CAB's references to "undermining the economic basis" of low-fare
proposals and uneconomic use of a first-class aircraft in a low-fare service
which lead it to conclude that United's proposal is unjust and discrimina-
tory are hardly appropriate. They suggest that the Board is donning full
battle garb to fight United's attempt to engage in a rate-making war
which it expects will be carried out on an atomic scale. United, however,
pointed out that its proposal was intended to apply to one flight per day
in each direction and that it contemplated no additional frequencies. This
one flight-the only United DC-6 service to Las Vegas-is demanded by
21' Not to confine its operating alternatives too much, United also provided that the tariff
would apply to DC-6B aircraft. DC-6B seating would be mainly four-abreast but would have
some five-abreast rows and would have 74 seats compared to the DC-6's 69 (and Western's 87 or
92).
22 United Air Lines, Inc. (propeller fare between Los Angeles and Las Vegas), sura note 200.20 United Air Lines, Inc. (propeller fare between Los Angeles and Las Vegas), CAB Docket
No. 15996, CAB Order No. E-22130 (4 May 1965) (denying petitions for reconsideration). More
recent developments point up the analysis advanced in the text. Since the Board indicated that it
would approve the same $13 jet commuter fare for a propeller service, Western filed a $13 jet
commuter tariff applicable to L-188 (Electra) aircraft with five-abreast seating at a 38-inch pitch.
The complaint of Bonanza was dismissed and the tariff went into effect. Western Air Lines, Inc.
(propeller commuter fares and seating configuration revision), CAB Docket No. 16198, CAB Order
No. E-22307 (14 June 1965). TWA then filed a revision applicable to its jet commuter service in
the Las Vegas and San Francisco markets, proposing to use Convair 880 aircraft whose coach con-
figuration is five-abreast. TWA argued that this service was "essentially similar" to Western's
Electra service. The CAB disagreed and ordered the tariff revision suspended. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. (jet commuter service seating configuration revisions), CAB Docket No. 16301, CAB Order
No. E-22364 (28 June 1965). Thus, the Board has held that five-abreast jet-prop service is essen-
tially similar to six-abreast jet coach, Western Air Lines, supra; that five-abreast jet coach is essen-
tially similar to six-abreast jet coach (the distinction never even being suggested); but that five-
abreast jet coach is not essentially similar to five-abreast Electra service, despite the fact that be-
tween Las Vegas and Los Angeles, the flight times on the two craft are almost identical. Of course,
CAB Order No. E-22364 supra suspended only the Convair 880 tariff in the Las Vegas market. As
would be expected, the revision in the Los Angeles-San Francisco market was approved.
' United Air Lines, Inc. (propeller fare between Los Angeles and Las Vegas), CAB Docket No.




the carrier's certification to serve Grand Junction, Colorado. As in any
rational rate scheme considering traffic density, the flight serving Grand
Junction operates on a first-class basis. United, therefore, was simply
seeking the small amount of additional revenue which efficient use of its
resources demanded."'5 Its position was hardly different from TWA's San
Francisco service. The marginal cost of a four-abreast seat on a United
DC-6 was undoubtedly less than the marginal cost (let alone the direct
cost) of one additional passenger for Western. Aside from the matter of
PSA's unregulated participation in the San Francisco market, the incon-
sistency between the two decisions considered here is: without any rational
explanation. In such circumstances, the Board's references to "competi-
tion" and "discrimination" are little more than a verbal smokescreen.
One can only conclude that the Board's predominant concern remains
today unchanged from that which it emphasized during the industry's
developmental and subsidized phase: proposals which maximize revenue
will be given favorable consideration. Those which may reduce the over-
all revenue level will generally receive summary-and usually negative-
treatment with little concern for the fact that they may have a sound
economic basis and, indeed, might even yield increased profits. "
3. The Tendency Toward Cost-Increasing Forms of Competition
The consequence of limiting the efficiency-based responses which a
carrier can make to competition is to emphasize competitive conduct
which increases costs."0 7 For the most part, regulation has ignored this
factor, as in Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,08 where
the Board refused to consider the charge that selling liquor aboard air-
craft might be a form of unfair competition. The Board has acted, how-
ever, where a carrier's practice would reflect on the "uniform" indices
necessary for regulation. Thus, in considering an early United proposal
similar in result (although not in motivation) to the Las Vegas proposal
treated immediately above, it noted that:
by regularly selling less seats than the number specified in this tariff on
205 As noted earlier, the air carrier is encouraged to seek particular types of volume in particular
amounts by the economic characteristics of the industry. If United (or Western) operated twelve
Los Angeles-Las Vegas frequencies in four-abreast DC-6 aircraft and charged $11.43, it might not
be economically sound. Neither would it be sound if United offered coach service to Grand Junction
so that it could have a properly-configured aircraft for an $11.43 Las Vegas service which it would
operate once a day. The Board's action gave United the chance only to choose between two in-
efficient operations; for Western, efficiency would require that it maintain its present posture and
not respond to United's maneuver. United now operates the service through Las Vegas to Grand
Junction and beyond in coach aircraft. This may be more efficient given the CAB's position, but
the fact that the carrier is able to operate the entire flight as a coach flight should not be taken
as a sign that the Board's decision was correct or that absent regulatory intervention, this operating
pattern would be an efficient use of resources.
' The relation between ad hoc adjudication and the Board's philosophy cannot be overlooked.
The "increased profits" prospect, while occasionally visible in the context of one case (as in United's
Las Vegas proposal), more often will depend on the carrier's ability to make other adjustments in
his operations in other markets. E.g., had Delta been allowed to pool Orlando and Atlanta traffic
(note 187 supra), one aircraft would have been freed for production in another market. When the
CAB approaches a problem on a subject-matter basis, it generally does much better. Cf. Seating
Configurations, Domestic Trunklines, 30 C.A.B. 1571 (1960) (seating configurations may vary by
aircraft and carrier so long as space is adequately utilized).
2"'See generally Gelman, supra note 153. See also Caves 168.
2s 18 C.A.B. 145 (1953). See also, Gellman, supra note 153, at 160.
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coach flights, United is able to offer Coach service superior to that offered
by other carriers. The competitive impact ...would probably force other
carriers to follow suit. . . .This, in turn, would make coach service un-
economic and impossible on many routes.'
What United proposed was to offer the coach passenger the same amount
of room he previously had, simply removing the center seat to provide
wider aisles. 1 The passenger received no more or less for his fare than
before. Any "discrimination," therefore, was a function of inter-carrier
relationships. United determined that it could make a profit with this
configuration. 1' The Board feared that other, less efficient carriers could
not. Thus, as a "penalty" for its efficiency, United would be required to
invest in extensive cabin modifications in order to have the prescribed five-
abreast configurations, or sacrifice efficiency and revenue potential by re-
taining first-class service. In short, emphasis on service competition is not
only a matter of increasing costs, but also forces the carrier to incur in-
creased out-of-pocket expense."'
In part, this serves to explain the phenomenon of high fare levels in
competitive markets which-since they are generally long-hauls with
lower operating costs-would otherwise be expected to produce the oppo-
site result. This tendency is justified by the Board by referring to the need
for "internal subsidization": the support of operations in "thin" markets
by profits obtained in more profitable "dense" markets. Therefore, the
argument proceeds, competitive fares must be kept sufficiently high to
absorb a part of this burden. Moreover, if this practice is to achieve the
desired end, carriers must be dissuaded from seeking increased profitability
by reducing costs or increasing the revenue-cost ratio in competitive
markets if the efficiency is derived wholly from the carrier's operating
characteristics or route structure, since the benefits of such a maneuver
will flow only to the single carrier and the competitive advantage over its
competitors will make it more difficult for them to practice internal sub-
sidization.
The argument ignores the fact that "the Board no longer gets much
internal subsidy for its trouble. '13 Trunklines have been relieved of their
obligation to serve numerous small communities and, indeed, have been
suspended in favor of local-service carriers at profitable points." ' Thus,
209 United Air Lines, Inc.-Petition for a Change in Coach Policy and for Exemption, CAB
Docket No. 5884, CAB Order No. E-7062 (6 Jan. 1953). See also, United Air Lines, Inc.-Re-
duction in DC-4 Seating Configurations for Air Coach Service, CAB Docket No. 5914, CAB Order
No. E-7126 (2 Feb. 1953).0 See Berge, Regulation of Air Coach Service Standards, 20 J. Air L. & Com. 25, 27 (1953).
21 Ibid.
21'Both practices reduce net income, but unlike United's single expenditure for seat removal,
Northwest had to add a continuing expenditure for liquor. This is not to say that Northwest was
engaging in unfair competition; or that a decision to sell (or provide) liquor on flights was irra-
tional; or that the CAB should deal with liquor, cloth napkins and similar matters on an ad-judicatory basis. However, the cost-increasing effects of the CAB's approach to competition will be
felt more and more in the current phase, as technologically-based fare reductions cease to occur and
demand for air transportation increases among cost-conscious consumers.
2'3 Caves 446.
"" Consider, e.g., the points deleted from American Airlines' routes during 1962-63: Springfield
and Peoria, Illinois, Ozark Air Lines and American Airlines, Service at Peoria & Springfield, CAB
Docket Nos. 11482 and 11486, CAB Order No. E-18446 (13 June 1962); Akron-Canton, Ohio,
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the question is no longer one of "loss" routes vs. profitable ones, but
simply the recognition that not all routes are equally profitable. If compe-
tition in the profitable markets will lower fares and result in fare in-
creases in less profitable markets, the resulting fare-structure need not
automatically be one in which some consumers receive a discriminatory
preference and others bear a discriminatory burden. Such practices would
only be "discriminatory" if air transportation between Chicago and Los
Angeles is considered to be the same "product" as air transportation be-
tween, say, Evansville, Indiana, and Huntsville, Alabama. 1'
If, however, one accepts the premise that the air carrier industry is a
multi-product producer, rate-making principles such as that suggested by
Grossman are applicable: "The rate for a service shall in no case be higher
because of another service of the same carrier, than it would be if the
other service were non-existent.""'  This implies a recognition of factors
such as marginal cost and elasticity of demand reflected in the carrier's
operations. Such a standard would, of course, have to be incorporated into
the definition of discrimination heretofore advanced. In part, it is accom-
plished by requiring that the carrier establish, through its own method of
costing, the qualitative significance of the proposed rate. Further, it means
simply that losses from experimentation in rate structure should not serve
as grounds for pushing other rates beyond the "zone of reasonableness."
Once the theory of "internal subsidization" is recognized as little more
than another variation on the theme of industry homogeneity, the treat-
ment of attempts to reduce costs must be altered to correspond to the
rate-making principle quoted above. The following standard would ap-
pear appropriate:
Costs incurred by a carrier in producing a given product should not be
higher, because of any competitor's service, than they would be if the other
competitor's service was non-existent, unless such costs will result in a
profitable increase in revenue which would not be obtained if the increased
costs were not incurred.
2 7
Applied, for example, to Delta's proposed West Coast-Orlando-Atlanta
routing,"'s National's competitive services should not be relied upon as a
ground for denying Delta the cost-savings inherent in being able to pool
American Airlines Service to Akron Case, CAB Docket No. 12438, CAB Order No. E-19259 (31
Jan. 1963); and Joplin, Mo., Reopened Kansas-Oklahoma Local Service Case, CAB Docket No. 5482
et. al., CAB Order No. E-19560 (3 May 1963).
215 Even if the "product" is expanded to some wider definition, the "burden" theory would only
be applicable to the extent that costs were identical. See Caves 163. Moreover, even if costs were
identical, differentiating between consumers might still be justified. "In its meaning as simple Eng-
lish, a discrimination is more than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the
idea that some relationship exists between the parties . . . which entitles them to equal treatment.
.. 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utterback).
21 Grossman, Principles of Carrier Rate Regulation, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 475, 477 (1951).
217 Of course, costs may be higher for a number of other reasons aside from competition. As
the italicized portion emphasizes, costs which yield increased profit should not be viewed adversely,
even if they are incurred as a result of competition. However, the profit judgment should be made
by comparing the outcome if the costs are not incurred with that which will obtain if they are.
Thus, if incurring costs because of competition will simply yield lower net income at the same
market share, the carrier should evaluate the possibility of sacrificing market share in favor of
maintaining the present return.
21 See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
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Orlando and Atlanta traffic. If market factors change and Delta can
operate separate flights at a higher level of profitability, the increased costs
are justified. However, in such an instance, no regulatory agency will
have to order Delta to cease pooling traffic on one flight. The change will
be dictated by the carrier's own self-interest.
4. The Absence of a De Minimis Approach to Discrimination
One final manifestation of the Board's attempt to impose uniformity on
the industry is demonstrated by its failure to develop a substantial category
of pricing conduct in which any possible negative effect is considered as
de minimis. The decision in Allegheny Fare Case"' seems to be the closest
the Board has come to recognizing the possibility of such an approach,
although it was unwilling to apply the reasoning of that case to a com-
petitive situation (Delta's Orlando proposal) and apparently never even
treated the de minimis aspect in United's Las Vegas fare."' Arguably,
this failure also arises from the interaction of the Board's concern for
maximizing industry revenues and its desire to avoid differences between
carriers.
Thus, on the one hand, the Board has stated that a carrier's claim that
a proposed tariff will not affect a substantial amount of revenue "proves
too much, for it derogates from any asserted promotional value...' On
this ground, the Board rejected American Airline's fifty per cent discount
to former employees traveling once a year to their annual convention.
While the practice would appear to be a reasonable goodwill gesture of
little impact, it is subject to criticism inasmuch as it is not functionally
available to the public. The Board's analysis, however, does not rest on
functional availability. It applies the same principle in instances where
the carrier is attempting to increase traffic, even when a non-competitive
point is involved."' One would expect that the same approach would be
used to defeat a carrier's special fare for "grandmothers to Schenectady.""'
On the other hand, if the tariff is functionally available to more people
than its promotional value can produce, the Board argues that the pro-
posal is "self-diverting." Thus, while personal discrimination is apparently
de minimis, the tariff is "discriminatory" because it debases revenue. For
example, in the Summer Excursion Fares Case' the Board noted that pro-
posed Florida summer excursion fares would be available to practically
219 Allegheny Fare Case, supra note 189.
"'0But cf. National Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceedings, 31 C.A.B. 390, 393 (1960) (sale
of lounge seats as first-class accommodations not discriminatory in view of the fact that only 5
such sales were made out of 4,600 opportunities). This is so de ininimis as to make any use of the
case as establishing a de nininis precedent highly questionable.
"3 American Airlines Reduced Fares For Former Employees, CAB Docket No. 14325, CAB Order
No. E-19906 (15 Aug. 1963). See also, Keyes, Passenger Fare Policies of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, 18 J. Air L. & Coin. 46, 62 (1951).
"See Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B. 440 (1961). Here, fac-
tors of subsidy and truly below-cost rates may be the real basis for the decision. However, the ex-
tent to which the "how much revenue is affected" test is merely a tool employed in the CAB's
revenue-seeking management is demonstrated by the fact that when National Trailways Bus System
applied the test to a military standby tariff, the Board quickly pointed out that no per se rules
existed. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. (military standby fare), CAB Docket No. 15845, CAB Order
No. E-21845 (26 Feb. 1965).
223 See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
22411 C.A.B. 218 (190).
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all passengers already using Florida air service in the summer. On this
basis, it found that a reduced summer fare would discriminate against
users of the service in the winter!2. The carriers justified the fare as a
promotional device, encouraging off-season use of Florida services. How-
ever, even if we accept the Board's conclusion that the excursion fare does
not stimulate traffic... (probably an erroneous conclusion since the effect
of economic recession on travel volume was ignored),"' we are still left
with the fact that summer service is off-peak and a rational system of
cost-allocation would take that into account.
The CAB, however, refused to accept Eastern's estimate of marginal
cost which made the fare proposal more than "compensatory..... In fact,
the Board did not even argue that the fare fell below fully-allocated costs.
Its sole concern was with "improving or maintaining the net financial
position of the carriers. ' 20 Thus, both sides of the de minimis argument
are foreclosed.
The crux of the self-diversion argument is nothing more than a barrier
to cost-based rate-making with the competitive activity which that would
entail. It must proceed from the assumption that the carrier will act
irrationally so that the paternal judgment of the CAB is required. As in
Summer Excursion Fares, the Board's judgment is likely to be colored by
its concern with revenue. This may be appropriate where the carrier is
heavily subsidized,"' but it would appear to be unjustifiable where opera-
tions cover costs and the carrier can choose between maintaining Florida
summer service to foster his "identity" in the market and employing some
portion of his resources in other markets where the marginal profit is
greater. If a fare is truly self-diverting, consumers will switch to the
lower-fare service in such volume as will eliminate the off-peak condition
and precipitate a return to a higher fare. Given the fact that all carriers
have the option of re-allocating resources to other markets and even the
option of contracted operations with minimal adverse effects23' it would
seem doubtful that any fare would be driven so low as would make it
injurious to any carrier in a meaningful sense.
The Board's failure to carve out a de minimis area is but another example
of its inability to promote meaningful competition. More unfortunate,
however, is its institutional inability to define an area in which rates, or
relations between rates are prima facie reasonable, requiring only a good-
faith demonstration by the carrier, perhaps by filing an analysis based
on its managerial philosophy which sets out the cost data and/or promo-
tional factors which lead it to propose the rate."5 At the same time, the
2
-1 Id. at 220-21.2
20 Id. at 221.
127 See Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey and Analysis-ll, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 148, 150-51 (1958).
22s Summer Excursion Fares Case, supra note 224, at 221.22
, Id. at 223.
'"0See, e.g., Seattle-Fairbanks Fare Investigation, CAB Docket No. 13055, CAB Order No.
E-18212 (12 Apr. 1962).
211 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
23 While the CAB is still somewhat unwilling to let each carrier's philosophy be determinative,
it has recognized the value of requiring carriers to compare their predictions of stimulation with
actual revenue and expense results. See CAB Press Release No. 63-63, 4 Nov. 1963.
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Board could continue to use its maximum rate power to assure that man-
agerial miscalculations in one market would not force rates above the
"reasonable" level in other markets and would continue to use its "single-
entity" approach to describe an appropriate range of returns on invest-
ment.
This "area of freedom" might well be based on Caves' suggestion of
setting a minimum and maximum at ten per cent above and below pre-
vailing fares"3 or by removing minimum restrictions entirely (or by a
two-step process incorporating both ideas)." No doubt most carriers,
whose attitudes have been formed by the fact of regulation, will approach
the open door with considerable trepidation and forecasts of impending
doom. Indeed, one can expect that the general fare level will initially rise
somewhat." The regulation which has been developed on an ad hoc basis
is in almost total opposition to the economic characteristics and condition
of the industry. Continuation of the present approach does not foster
sound conditions, no matter what the short-run effect. In the long run,
it tends to increase reliance on regulatory rather than market forces, in-
crease costs and further rate-making and operations which are unrelated
to cost.
D. Specific Problems Of Pricing Technique
In considering the theoretical shortcomings of the ad hoc approach to
regulation and the institutional pressures for uniformity reflected therein,
the preceding sections have dealt with a number of varied pricing tech-
niques. It would seem desirable, in addition, to briefly consider a few of
these techniques directly, to discuss the specific problems they pose and
their possible treatment under the philosophy of increasing managerial
freedom in carrier pricing which has been suggested herein.
1. The Problem of Identity Fares
The definition of discrimination heretofore suggested 3' does not fully
consider the question of differentials for specific groups. Assuming that
the Board finds a differential to be functionally available to a category of
persons, it would then have to face the question of what sort of groups
are appropriate for differential treatment. This is a particularly thorny
question. It is none too difficult if the group can be described in terms
of travel characteristics, as may be possible for excursion fares or the
"Visit U.S.A." fares available to overseas tourists. 37 It is even easier if
prior experience demonstrates that the group has specific cost character-
istics, as numerical group fares and a proper view of both the Pittsburgh-
233 Caves 448.
234 Since the success of any such plan would depend on the alternatives carrier management has
in responding to competition, the removal of minimum restrictions would in no case succeed without
some corresponding increase in management alternatives in the field of operating authority. The
possibility of moving to this point in stages is discussed infra note 315.
235 Caves 432.
' See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
M The $150 fare and 21-day duration, coupled with the local service carrier-only applicability,
require substantial traveling in a short period of time in order to result in a savings. However, in
setting the fare level, the CAB informally urged carriers to consider the tariff as "a means to help
solve our balance of payments problems." See CAB Press Release 65-S1, 18 May 1965.
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Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare case"' and the Mohawk student pro-
posal2. would demonstrate. What, however, if "hard" evidence of these
factors is absent?
The problem is most clearly pointed-up by the recent "youth fare"
experiment. 20 The carriers could only guess at the demand elasticity of
persons aged twelve to twenty-two and at the extent to which regular
passengers would be diverted. On the one hand, even if demand was not
increased greatly, the tariff might have a salutary effect in peak traffic
periods by moving the student passengers to stand-by status and freeing
reservations on prime flights. On the other hand, the problem of no-shows
was likely to be increased by duplicate (and even multiple) reservations.
The Board's decision to allow actual experience to be determinative was
soundly based. As it was, most carriers cancelled the tariff before its
expiration date.
However, before reaching the conclusion that the experiment is de-
sirable, there should be some probability that, after experience, some sort
of cost or travel characteristic will be found. In other words, the dimen-
sions of an identity group would have to be sufficiently wide to provide
a basis for correlating the data obtained with an index of significance.4 1
While many identity fares undoubtedly will have wide application,"2
there will be instances where one carrier's route or market structure makes
a particular group appropriate for differential treatment by it alone.
Indeed, this has occurred with youth fares, which remain in effect on
two local service linesP and in partial effect in the Caribbean area.'
It would also seem desirable to establish a per se rule against singling
out groups for differential treatment on the grounds of "social policy"
alone. Two carriers, Frontier and Ozark, have attempted such action to
date. Both maintain a 50 per cent clergy tariff, subject to an annual 5
dollar identification card charge. In Frontier Teachers' Tariff,' however,
Frontier's attempt to offer educational personnel a 40 per cent discount
238 Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Case, suPra note 185.
' Reduced Fares For Students Proposed by Mohawk Airlines, supra note 142.
.4 In the matter of "youth" fares proposed by the Domestic Carriers, CAB Docket No. 12985,
CAB Order No. E-17367 (25 Aug. 1961).
241 As to "significance," see text following note 57 supra. An identity fare for, say, editors of
legal periodicals, would not be appropriate for "experimental" treatment. While it might be possible
to categorize the travel habits and cost aspects of such a group, the dimensions of the group are
not wide enough to suggest that the data which would be compiled would reveal any distinctions
between the group and the general travel market.
242 To the extent that it would appear in advance that an experimental identity fare would
probably be emulated by all carriers (as the "youth" fare), the Board is justified in applying the
"industry revenue" tests it has used in fare level and rate-of-return investigations. There is a point
at which the possibility of detriment to the industry outweighs the value of testing for identity
groups, particularly where the carriers have alternatives in the area of market-density correlations,
and other techniques which will have a greater effect on the overall public. Note, however, that we
are concerned here only with identity fare proposals that cannot be cost-justified in advance.
243 Trans-Texas and Frontier airlines. Frontier's tariff is particularly interesting in that it re-
quires purchase of an annual identification card at a $5 fee. See Carter, Shifting Fixed Costs in a
Scheme of Promotional Fares, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 283 (1955). This same card fee is used by
Frontier for its clergy tariff and was incorporated in Ozark's "Senior Citizen" tariff, infra note 246.
.. See Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc. (Student Standby Fares), CAB Docket No. 15786,
CAB Order No. E-21667 (12 Jan. 1965) (suspending the carrier's proposal except for those routes
involving foreign air transportation, where no suspension power exists).
245 CAB Docket No. 14526, CAB Order Nos. E-20436 (examiner's initial decision) and E-20437
(adopting examiner's decision as CAB opinion) (4 Feb. 1964).
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was rejected. More recently, Ozark's proposal to extend the 5 dollar annual
fee to "Senior Citizens," offering a round-trip at 150 per cent of the one-
way fare to persons 62 and older, was suspended by the Board '  and
subsequently cancelled by the carrier."7
The clergy fare may be justified by the railroad practice, although it is
odd that only two carriers have felt the competitive impact in this area."
The teachers' tariff, however, is admittedly based on the median incomes of
educators in the states served by Frontier.4 9 Ozark's senior citizen proposal
may well have been developed with some assumption regarding the num-
ber of elderly persons in small middle western communities and the migra-
tion of younger family members to larger communities. If so, it could have
been supported by a market analysis and possibly drawn to describe the
group by travel characteristics (length of stay, frequency of trips, possi-
bly even destination) rather than by the passenger's age. As presented,
however, it rested wholly on offering elderly persons a preference.
To introduce the concept that the airlines are the guardians of our
social conscience and base fares on this notion is of questionable value.
Of course, the Board's treatment of military stand-by fares25 is not in
line with this approach. Assuming that stand-by transportation is in fact
a different product, as the Board asserts,"' the justification for restricting
the sale of this product to military personnel is based solely on considera-
tions of soldier's morale and the similar practices of surface-carriers."22
However, whatever the theoretical deficiencies of the Board's treatment
of the problem, as a practical matter the military stand-by fares are
probably legitimately excluded from the general rule."' Were the Board
to act otherwise, it would be safe to assume that Congress would carve
out a legislative exception to the same effect.
2. The Use of "Tour Basing" Fares and Similar Excursion Requirements
As we have noted, one method of taking advantage of variations in
demand elasticity in the consumer market is by focusing on the travel
characteristics of groups susceptible to stimulation, using these character-
" Ozark Air Lines, Inc. (Senior Citizen Excursion Tariff), CAB Docket No. 16004, CAB
Order No. E-21973 (31 March 1965).
247 Ozark Air Lines, Inc. (Senior Citizen Excursion Tariff), CAB Docket No. 16004, CAB Order
No. E-22129 (4 May 1965).
'8 In any case, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was specifically amended to allow this prac-
tice, 70 Stat. 784 (1956), carried forward in Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403 (b), 72 Stat. 758,
49 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1958).
" Frontier Teachers' Tariff, CAB Docket No. 14526, CAB Order No. E-20436 (4 Feb. 1964)
at 5-6.
2 These tariffs, originally put into effect in the spring of 1963, have now generally been made
effective indefinitely. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos. 15845, 15925, 15973, 15983,
16000, 16025 & 16026, CAB Order No. E-22186 (20 May 1965); American Airlines, Inc., CAB
Docket Nos. 15925, 15983, 16025 & 16026, CAB Order No. E-22068 (22 April 1965); Braniff
Airways, Inc., CAB Docket Nos. 15973 & 16000, CAB Order No. E-22000 (6 April 1965); and
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra note 222. Civilian employees of the federal government lost any
privileges long ago. See Governmental Travel Discount Tariff Investigation, 6 C.A.B. 825 (1946).
211 Allegheny Airlines, Inc., CAB Order No. E-22186 (20 May 1965) at 3.
255 Cf. the finding of Examiner Edward T. Stodola in Certificated Air Carrier Military-Tender
Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902 (1959) supra note 171.
2ss Another isolated example might be the CAB's treatment of United Nations delegates. Al-
though the Board denied a blanket exemption for specal UN trips at a 20% discount, American
Airlines United Nations Delegates Group Fares, CAB Docket No. 14959, CAB Order No. E-20385
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istics to describe the applicability of a lower fare. The result is often an
excursion fare tariff, conditioned on a stated interval between going and
returning trips or a "tour basing fare," i.e., a tariff whose applicability
depends on additional factors outside of the conditions of carriage.
Initially the Board dealt with tour basing tariffs under a per se approach
which stemmed from erroneously labeling the technique a "tie-in" sale.
Thus, in Tour Basing Fares,' a Pan Am proposal for a fare differential
on excursions to South America which required passengers to travel on
an all-expense tour was found to represent,
"an objectionable form of discrimination, in that [it] embod[ies] the
essentials of a tie-in sale. . . .Nothing in the promotional and competitive
considerations advanced by the carriers is sufficient to justify such a dis-
crimination.""
Inasmuch as there seems to have been no evidence that passengers were
limited in their choice of land accommodations nor any discussion of Pan
Am's subsidiary, Intercontinental Hotels Corporation,' the conclusion
that the tariff represented a tie-in is somewhat inaccurate.
In any case, beginning in 1960, various tour basing fares were permitted
on an "experimental" basis." 7 A formal investigation of such fares, docket-
ed in 1963,2" proceeded through the hearing stage, but upon cancellation
of the particular tariff involved, the proceeding was dismissed."' Imme-
diately afterward, the Board announced that it would not investigate
proposed East Coast-Florida group tour basing/excursion fares which re-
quired purchase of an "advertised air tour" whose non-air components
sold for at least 28 dollars.' While not giving unqualified approval to
the practice, the Board noted that the summer-only fare would expire
before investigation was practical.
Shortly thereafter, East Coast-Florida carriers filed individual tour
basing fares at prices identical to the group tariffs. All were suspended for
investigation."' A proposal to eliminate minimum-stay provisions from
(22 Jan. 1964), it has, on two occasions, allowed such flights to take place. American Airlines,
CAB Docket No. 14257, CAB Order No. E-19839 (22 July 1963); United Air Lines, CAB Docket
No. 14663, CAB Order No. E-19842 (22 July 1963). But cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc., CAB
Docket No. 16272, CAB Order No. E-22375 (29 June 1965) (denying exemption to provide dis-
count round-trip to five members of winning team in Marine Corps-sponsored physical fitness con-
test).
254 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
"I Id. at 259.
'A sketch of International Hotel's operations may be found in Monopoly Problems in Regu-
lated Industries, Hearings, supra note 38, at 2596-97. One wonders why more carriers did not turn
to vertical integration to promote vacation travel during the period when they could not offer sig-
nificant fare differentials because of CAB policy.
27 See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (Group Fares), CAB Docket No. 16129, CAB Order No. E-22128
(4 May 1965).
"'8Tour Basing Fares Case, CAB Docket No. 14901, CAB Order No. E-20276 (18 Dec. 1963)
(investigating an economy tour-basing fare proposed by Trans Caribbean for New York-San Juan
service in particular).
"..Tour Basing Fares Case, CAB Docket No. 14901, CAB Order No. E-21880 (8 March 1965).
"'Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15991, CAB Order No. E-21952 (26 March 1965)
(while National and Northeast Airlines joined Eastern in group excursion fare proposals, only
Eastern filed a group tour basing fare. National filed an individual excursion fare which was sus-
pended).
"' Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 16228, CAB Order No. E-22289 (10 June 1965)
(filed 14 May 1965).
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individual excursion fares was treated similarly."2 Finally, when Midwest-
Florida carriers filed group tour basing tariffs, the Board (while allowing
the fares to become effective) set the matter for a forthcoming investi-
gation. 6
While the tariffs involved may expire before the procedural process is
completed, the recurrent nature of Florida summer strategies suggest that
this time the Board will consider the matter to its conclusion. Assuming
that the antitrust based tie-in argument is discarded, the objections to
tour basing tariffs are still valid, insofar as the air carrier should not be
concerned whether the tourist stays in a hotel or with friends. In terms
of the definition of discrimination advanced herein, the ground facilities
used by the passenger do not impart "significance" to the category.
The duration limits of excursion fares are a sufficient device for sepa-
rating passenger types.'" Indeed, the tariff originally proposed by Eastern
recognizes that no distinction is provided by the tour basing feature. The
fare specified for the tour is identical to the excursion (non-tour) fare."'
The identity of proposed individual and group excursion fares, on the
other hand, may stand on a different ground. At this stage, the issue seems
to have focused on the assumed cost savings in group travel. However, in
light of the pendency of a formal investigation, carriers will undoubtedly
also consider possible distinctions in elasticity and travel habits between
individuals and group-ticketed passengers. Assuming that cost differences
do exist, identical fares may nonetheless be justified by different stimula-
tion factors; .66 variations in the minimum stay required" may be a further
device for differentiating between individual and group traffic.
3. The Assumptions of Family-Plan Fares
The Board has never faced the question of family fares in a full-scale
proceeding, the first investigation projected in Capital Family-Plan Case"'
and the recent Family Fares case"' both having been dismissed. In passing,
however, Board members have suggested that family fares represent the
262 Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15986, CAB Order No. E-22020 (9 April 1965).
263 Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra note 2 57.
"4 The extent to which the duration limits can be used to describe the boundaries of excursion
travel is indicated in Continental Air Lines' recent Denver stopover provision in its Middle West-
Los Angeles excursion tariff. See Continental Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15811, CAB Order
No. E-21787 (11 Feb. 1965) (eighteen-day travel limit; stopover must be made at Denver on
either going or return trip; Denver stopover can be no less than twelve hours). While the twelve-
hour specification does not seem too lengthy, the fare established ($1 over the nonstop rate) limits
the value of the tariff to those who actually want to stop at Denver for something more than a
business conference. The tariff might have been more artfully drawn without losing effectiveness,
however the introduction of stop-over requirements, along with time limits opens the door to a
number of variations on the same theme.
"'Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra note 260.
'Assuming, of course, that individual excursions and group tours are not interchangeable
alternatives for many people.
""Presently, carriers have confined themselves to stating lengths of time, e.g., 6-22 days. If
individual excursioners have different travel habits, it might be found in length of stay require-
ments which cover only part of the range, e.g., requiring return trips to be made after 6-9 days
or after 20-24 days for individuals and 8-16 days for groups. This is another possible variation on
duration limits. See also, supra note 264.
"'26 C.A.B. 8 (1957).
"'CAB Docket No. 14813, CAB Order No. E-20229 (4 Dec. 1963) (instituting investigation);
CAB Order No. E-21617 (28 Dec. 1964) (dismissing investigation).
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outer limits of allowable discrimination and have made vague references
to "the social interest in the family [which] will justify special fares
which would otherwise contravene the rule."' 0
The discussion of identity fares above suggests that justification of
family fares on some societal theory is ill-considered."' As a first-class
only tariff, the practice seeks justification in the argument that all family
members occupy otherwise empty first-class seats and thus, the marginal
cost of the service provided is more than covered by the discounted fare
and coach seats may be sold at the full rate. When extended to coach and
other low fare services,"' the promotional effect of the tariff on wholly
new traffic otherwise lost to air transportation is emphasized.
In short, the grouping of family fares is subject to justification on a
differential elasticity theory rather than on the notion that the carrier
saves costs because it is a two, three, or four-person group. Given the
multiple dimensions of market, product (first-class, coach, etc.), and
possibly even season, different approaches may be justifiable for different
carriers. It may be advantageous for one to apply a single rate systemwide
and for another carrier to use different rates in different markets.
The most recent modification in family fares""' appears to confirm this
analysis, with carriers extending the family discount to weekend traffic at
a different discount and a different coach/first-class ratio. The full import
of these innovations will be considered infra."
IV. CONCLUSION-AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS UNDER A
MODIFIED REGULATORY SCHEME
A. The Findings Suggested By This Study
The preceding parts of this study have been devoted to an examination
of the historical bases for carrier regulation, the interplay between eco-
nomic characteristics and regulatory attitudes and the evolution, by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, of restrictions on the freedom of air carriers to
act as individual competitive units in pricing and producing the products
they are capable of selling.
The discussion of these problems leads to several conclusions which
must be set down before proceeding further:
1. The economics and technology of commercial air transport make
competitive pricing possible and desirable.
270 Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41, 47 (1957).
271 Since no verification of marital relationships is made, such a justification may well be in-
accurate.
" This extension was precipitated by the numerous family fare proposals and counter-proposals
filed in the fall of 1963. See text accompanying notes 289-96 infra. See also, CAB Press Releases
No. 63-62, 16 Oct. 1963 and No. 63-92, 20 Dec. 1963.
... Family-Plan Fare Revisions filed by Domestic Trunkline Carriers, CAB Docket Nos. 16122
& 16124, CAB Order No. E-22170 (17 May 1965). See also CAB Press Release No. 65-50, 17
May 1965.
See text accompanying notes 296-99 infra. Briefly, the coach family fare discount was in-
creased from 25% to 33!/3% for the second family member and to 66Y39% for additional fam-
ily members under 21, these fares applicable on week-days only. No such change was made in first-
class fares. The 25% discount for all passengers in all classes applies on Friday midnight to Sunday
noon travel.
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2. The variations between carriers and differential pricing within a single
carrier's price structure would neither violate the "classic" notions of
transportation discrimination nor foster carrier practices which would
injure the air transport industry or the consumer, providing they fulfilled
the tests of functional availability and could be supported by a "good
faith" analysis of promotional value or theory of cost allocation.
3. It is desirable to define a range of "reasonable" fares without refer-
ence to conditions in any particular city-pair market, within which car-
riers would be free to price.
4. The possible extent of this range is related to the number of alterna-
tives carriers have in seeking efficiency and responding to competition
eliminating emulation as the automatic response.
5. The regulatory process is institutionally unable to create these condi-
tions or allow diversity to develop so long as it deals with pricing tech-
niques on an ad hoc basis or in a procedural context where competitive
responses are directed toward verbal maneuvers rather than toward realistic
market reactions.
6. The regulatory process will be unable to promote competition to the
fullest possible extent if it continues to use industry-wide tests and relies
on a managerial conception of its responsibility or if it uses its power to
enjoin discrimination as a facade to prevent competition.
7. The philosophy of regulation which the CAB has generally followed
finds no support in the economics of the transportation industry, par-
ticularly when air transportation is compared to other modes, and tends
to encourage cost-increasing forms of competition rather than the use
of sound costing techniques.
8. Therefore, the CAB's present approach to price regulation is in-
appropriate and should be modified, limiting the rule against "unjust dis-
crimination" to the two "classic" examples and the functional availability
test and removing most carrier pricing techniques (as opposed to rate-
of-return questions) from the case-by-case regulatory scrutiny involved
in suspensions before investigation, thus allowing actual market experience
to act as the primary investigatory focus."'
Recent developments suggest that both the Board and the industry are
beginning to explore the problems which give rise to these findings, reach-
ing conclusions apparently not wholly dissimilar from those set out above.
Accordingly, a brief consideration of the nature and extent of these de-
velopments and an even briefer mention of regulatory frontiers meriting
attention in the future are necessary capstones to this study.
B. Some Perceptible Changes In CAB Attitudes: The Approval Of
Non-Emulative Responses To Inter-Carrier Competition
The focal role of pricing technique in today's air carrier industry is
vividly demonstrated by the significant series of tariff proposals imple-
mented in the past twenty-four months. While the Board has tended to
... There would, of course, be no objection to CAB-carrier informal discussions (such as de-
veloped in promulgating the no-show plan) which might evaluate current trends in general terms,
subject, however, to public disclosure of the records of such conferences.
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approve each individual innovation under a general banner of "increased
experimentation," the carrier proposals, taken as a whole, reveal a pattern
of sound competitive conduct in which each carrier's response is shaped
by factors indigenous to its operations: route structure, market structure,
operating patterns, and managerial philosophy.
As noted earlier, there have been previous instances in which the
assumption of industry-wide emulation has been disproved in practice. 7 '
None of these, however, involved changes of major proportions. Since only
one or two carriers and/or one or two specific markets were involved,
approval of the tariffs did not stimulate competitive strategies by other
carriers leading to a visible pattern of non-emulative responses.
The earliest sign of the type of competitive conduct which might result
from a policy of allowing individualized responses is found in the strategies
undertaken in the transcontinental market by United, American, and
TWA in 1957- 58. The Board's concern with "discrimination" and revenue
and its ad hoc approach explain the failure to consider the filings as an
indication of an emerging form of competition. However, the 1957-58
cases provide a background against which the CAB's current treatment of
competitive developments without recourse to meaningless concepts of
discrimination may be viewed.
The starting point for the 1957-58 strategies was United's attempt to
increase its share of the transcontinental coach market by offering a more
luxurious service in faster DC-7 aircraft. The service, styled "Custom
Coach," featured new seating, hot meals, an additional stewardess and
other appointments at an increased fare above the more spartan coach
level. United succeeded in convincing the Board that this was a "new
class of service" rather than simply "coach with meals," which would
have contravened existing Board policy."'
With slower Constellation equipment, TWA faced a different problem.
It was losing first-class traffic to United and American DC-7 flights, its
share decreasing from 36 per cent to 14 per cent."' It had, however, equip-
ment being phased out of its transatlantic operation with the introduc-
tion of jet aircraft. This equipment had larger, fully-reclining "sleeper-
seats" in its first-class configuration. TWA thus transferred the equipment
to the domestic transcontinental run, offering 30 per cent more room-
albeit in slower aircraft-at no increase over the first-class fare.
Following complaints by United and American, TWA's practice was
investigated, although, in the interim, TWA was permitted to operate the
service, providing actual rather than hypothetical data by which the
technique could be evaluated. Using this data, the examiner found that
no discrimination was involved. Here, as in National Daylight Coach, the
conclusion was that the fare was "available to all." '279 Moreover, TWA's
270 E.g., the Capital Family Plan Case, supra note 147; the Mohawk Student Proposal, supra note
142 (American, Mohawk's competitor in the markets, neither objected nor filed a defensive tariff);
and the continued existence of "youth" fares, supra notes 243-44.
277 United Custom Coach, Suspension and Investigation, 26 C.A.B. 23, 24-27 (1957).
'27Trans World Airlines Siesta Sleeper-Seat Service, 27 C.A.B. 788, 789 (1958).
... Id. at 804 (dissenting opinion).
1965 ]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
load factor in the first-class compartment had previously dropped to 46
per cent."' The room that it was sacrificing, therefore, was unnecessary
room."' As Board Member Hector noted:
"The transcontinental TWA coach passenger does not pay any more for
his seat because of the siesta seat in the first-class compartment, and he
would not pay any less for his seat if the TWA siesta seat were discon-
tinued.' ,
28 2
The majority, however, found TWA's practice discriminatory, noting its
fears that TWA's practice would have an "uneconomical effect on the
operations of the carriers....
American's proposal, rejected in American Airlines Off-Peak Coach
Service,2s4 was filed in response to the TWA moveY.2 American would have
flown an off-peak overnight service using regular first-class equipment at
coach fares. The Board, however, concluded that the service was "like and
contemporaneous" with day service since there was no evidence that the
departure time was inconvenient.2" The Board did not consider that this
additional flight could be produced by equipment already being utilized
economically and that in terms of American's efficiency, the flight may
have been "off-peak." As in Delta Off-Peak, it chose to use the "time"
standard which could be applied to all operations in all markets on an
equal basis. Thus, again, the only discrimination is in terms of an artificially
imposed uniformity.
The CAB's switch from the decision in Custom Coach to the restrictive-
ness of TWA Siesta Sleeper Seat and American Off-Peak Coach has been
ascribed to its desire to "stop a new series of product competition strate-
gies.""' 7 Of course, the TWA and American proposals only become a "new
series" if each carrier's proposal is looked upon separately. In fact, the
three tariffs were part of one series which never was allowed to mature.
Had the Board left the carriers free to act, each would have chosen a
response to competition that best achieved efficient operation, given route
structure, equipment, and operations. United would have continued its
daylight Custom Coach, TWA its overnight luxury seats, and American
its off-peak coach. The public would have been offered a choice of services
which comported with efficient operation rather than identical service
running against it."'
"I Id. at 790.
281 Cf. text accompanying notes 102-03 supra (early DST premium pricing).
.2 Trans World Airlines Siesta Sleeper-Seat Service, supra note 278, at 806 (dissenting opinion).
Cf. Grossman, Principles of Carrier Rate Regulation, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 475, 477 (1951), text ac-
companying note 216 supra.
283 Trans World Airlines Siesta Sleeper-Seat Service, supra note 278, at 792.
214 28 C.A.B. 25 (1958).
282 See Trans World Airlines Siesta Sleeper-Seat Service, supra note 278, at 800 (dissenting
opinion).
'" American Airlines Off-Peak Coach Service, supra note 284, at 26, 27.
11 Caves 235.
288 Efficiency here is a function of the situation in which the carrier finds itself after its com-
petitor has acted. Thus, prior to United's and TWA's proposals, American might have found efficient
operations in an additional daytime flight or in not responding at all. Afterward, however, reducing
the number of daylight flights and adding a night transcontinental flight may have yielded greater
revenue per unit of production and better utilization of resources, if the aircraft could be used in
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The responses to United's one-class tariff and Continental's three-level
rates are, in many ways, reminiscent of the carrier strategies during 1957-
58. This time, however, the Board has not employed the subterfuge of
"discrimination," thereby allowing carriers the right to make differentiated
responses.
Following United's one-class filing, American countered with its favored
competitive tool, introducing family fares at an increased discount."s"
Despite complaints by TWA and Delta, the tariff went into effect.
Surprisingly, it worked too well, the increased discount creating the
anomalous situation of making two coach fares more expensive than two
first-class family fares. Pressure to reduce the discount naturally resulted.
Accordingly, TWA posted a family plan tariff with a 60 per cent dis-
count from first-class fares. During the next four weeks all trunkline car-
riers engaged in what can best be described as mock warfare, filing no less
than thirty-two separate tariff revisions, introducing family rates cover-
ing-with varying discounts-jet coach, one-class, propeller coach and
economy services, some discounts applying systemwide and others limited
to segments in which a systemwide discount was proposed by a com-
petitor.
The filings, defensive filings, counter-proposals and defensive matching
of counter-proposals, while indicative of the wide range of possible ad-
justments, degenerated into a mere numbers game in which the initial
object of lowering the discount was submerged and the competitive prac-
ticality of the proposals in terms of market effect ignored. 9 ' Recognizing
this, American turned to balancing the family discount with over-all rate
structure changes. United was its principal competitor in almost all of its
long-haul markets. Thus, American's strategy was to introduce a justi-
a new market during the day. Of course, with the introduction of jet equipment by all of the
carriers, these services would have been eliminated inasmuch as the competitive need would have
disappeared.
289 See Henzey, The Fare Muddle, American Aviation, January 1964, pp. 55-63.
29American Airlines, Inc. (proposed reduced family fares), CAB Docket Nos. 14332 & 14333,
CAB Order No. E-19535 (7 March 1963) (dismissing complaints of Trans World Airlines and
Delta). Curiously, no other carriers filed complaints with the Board, suggesting that there may have
been additional reasons for the increased discount aside from United's one-class service. Carriers
such as Braniff and Northeast would not adopt the increased discount on a systemwide basis as a
response to either United or American since their routes are not aligned against those carriers to
any significant degree.
.9 All of these proposals were suspended for investigation, American Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket
No. 14813, CAB Order No. E-20099 (16 Oct. 1963). The entire filing pattern is presented in
tabular form in CAB Press Release No. 63-62, 16 Oct. 1963.
.. This is an expected result in any system which relies on playing-out competitive responses
verbally without any market testing. By filing defensive tariffs identical to the main proposal, the
spectre of unchanged market shares at lower revenue is easily created. By filing counter-proposals
in an ever-descending spiral, the spectre of cut-throat competition is raised. In both cases, the
necessity for the CAB's industry-wide approach is artificially confirmed. Moreover, carriers can rely
on generalizations which are factually unsubstantiated. See United Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos.
14768 & 14813 (proposing extension of family plan to one-class service), Complaint of Delta Air
Lines, pp. 1-2 (alleging that United's proposal is 'uneconomic and unsound, unjust and unreasonable
[and] would have a profound adverse effect . . .") and Letter from C. E. Woolman, President
and General Manager, Delta Air Lines, to Irving Roth, Director, CAB Bureau of Economic Regu-
lation, 25 Sept. 1963, responding to request for economic data on family fares by advising that until
recently, no records were kept and the carrier is unable to state the relation between family fare
discounts and actual revenue with any accuracy. Hence, Delta had no basis for the allegations made
in United Air Lines, Inc., supra. See also, note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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fiable long-haul taper into its first-class rates, narrowing the gap between
first-class and one-class service.
American's tariff reduced first-class fares in selected markets from four
to fifteen per cent, eliminated jet surcharges in other markets and applied
a 25 per cent family fare discount to all domestic services. Its competitors
proceeded to request suspension and investigation of the proposal29 and
TWA countered with a plan to offer luxury service at an increase above
first-class, a "standard" service a bit below first-class and an economy
service a shade below present coach fares. American's plan (and the
" meeting competition" tariffs filed by others) went into effect,294 and
TWA's proposal was subsequently withdrawn."5 Other carriers who had
retained the old first-class fare in specific markets and the former 50 per
cent family-fare as well, reduced the family fare discount to 25 per cent
in all markets shortly thereafter.
The implementation of the long-haul taper and the family fare revisions
in such circumstances produced, as one would expect, different effects on
each of the carriers. These responses cannot be treated uniformly, but are
best viewed in three categories: (1) an additional family fare revision;
(2) an individual carrier-based restructuring of fare relationships; and
(3) a similarly-based change in seating/class/service relationships. These
developments are best considered singly despite their chronological con-
currency.
The details of the most recent family fare revision have been noted
above"' and need not be repeated. Their particular significance as part of
a pattern of competitive responses stems from the shift from the leveling
approach which focused on the marginal cost of a passenger "going along"
on someone else's trip to the promotional approach looking toward the
generation of new traffic.29 ' While the 25 per cent discount was uniformly
adopted as an initial response, this reaction was arguably in each carrier's
self interest, making it possible to analyze the promotional effect of family
fares on coach and first-class travel in general and as a function of the
spread between coach and first-class fares in particular.29"
The experience of several months' testing was evidently beneficial. The
features of the present plan, extending family fares to weekend travel,
increasing the coach fare discount for weekday travel, instituting an
added coach discount for family groups of more than two only for week-
293 In this case almost all carriers filed complaints. Cf. note 290 supra (the limited reaction
to the first American proposal). This concern was undoubtedly brought about by the appearance
of the distance taper which, unlike a variation in family fare discounts, required detailed consid-
eration of route and market structure by each carrier.
.. See CAB Press Release No. 63-92, 20 Dec. 1963.
292 Complaints of United Air Lines, Inc. & Continental Air Lines, Inc. against fares proposed by
Trans World Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos. 14930 & 14935, CAB Order No. E-20434 (4 Feb.
1964) (noting cancellation of proposal and dismissing complaints).
296 Note 274 supra.
W7 See text accompanying note 272 supra.
"' The CAB, however, did not approach the subject in this manner. Since it was concerned pri-
marily with the first-class family fare/coach regular fare inconsistency, it refused to allow first-
class fare reduction where carriers had not lowered the family discount. When the carriers all adopt-
ed the lower family discount, it ignored the fact that the first-class fares remained at their previous
level and dismissed the entire first-class fare investigation. Reduced First-Class Fares, CAB Docket
No. 14951, CAB Order No. E-21963 (30 March 1965).
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day travel, and making no corresponding distinction in first-class fares
would appear to be based on a highly sophisticated approach integrating
notions of demand elasticity and excess capacity. In dismissing complaints
against the tariff,299 the Board did not suggest that the various differentials
posed problems of discrimination, nor did it dwell on the fact that one
carrier's tariff applied only to competitive points and three carriers filed
no revision at all. While these four carriers subsequently adopted the
basic plan, this reaction may rest more on continuity of tradition than on
CAB pressure. United was left free to apply the coach features to its one-
class service, the first-class features to the second traveler in the "standard"
compartment of triple-configured aircraft and an in-between 50 per cent
discount to additional children in standard service, despite the fact that
the service features and (in most instances) the basic fare are identical
in one-class and standard class service. Apparently, the Board would have
been willing to take the same "no reliance on discrimination" approach
had other carriers sought to meet competition in competitive markets and
vary discounts, discount relationships or other factors in others.
This assumption is bolstered by the Board's treatment of Eastern's re-
structuring of fare relationships. Although American's introduction of a
long-haul first-class taper had narrowed the gap between first-class and
coach fares, it had not altered distance relationships in coach fares. Eastern
was faced with continued operating losses, a substantial number of short
and medium-haul services in comparatively inelastic markets (justifiably
given only first-class service) and long-haul routes which presumably
had greater potential for stimulation of first-class and coach traffic. By
adjusting existing fares to reflect a 5 per cent decrease and a flat 2.50
dollar increase, it sought to obtain increased revenue in all short and
medium-haul markets; stimulate long-haul traffic generally; and stimu-
late coach traffic selectively, increasing the cost of short-haul coach serv-
ice."' These changes were applied systemwide, notwithstanding the fact
that Eastern had already altered its rate structures in certain markets on
the basis of American's scheme.
The approval of this tariff on a cost-density basis, answering other
carrier's complaints relating to their fare structures by noting that their
route structures were not comparable and relegating the issue of Eastern's
losses to a footnote is, in itself, a major step forward. It is the first
instance in which approval of a pricing technique of major proportions has
been based on recognition of one carrier's distinct operating structure. Pos-
sibly even more important, the Board then proceeded to allow other carriers
to meet Eastern's reduced fares in competitive markets, maintaining their
lower fares in markets in which Eastern had raised its fare."1
The final development in individually-based competitive responses
emerging in the past twenty-four months and gaining similar CAB approv-
299 Family-Plan Fare Revisions Filed by Domestic Trunkline Carriers, supra note 273.
2
°Eastern Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15713, CAB Order No. E-21637 (4 Jan. 1965).
205Braniff Airways, Inc., et. al., CAB Docket No. 15823, CAB Order No. E-21806 (17 Feb.
1965); American Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15798, CAB Order No. E-21756 (3 Feb. 1965).
See also, CAB Press Release No. 65-14, 3 Feb. 1965.
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al has its genesis in the Chicago-Los Angeles market. In 1962, prior to the
appearance of United's one-class service and American's long-haul taper
reaction, Continental succeeded in introducing business and economy fares
into the market, 2 operating triple-configured aircraft as a result. While
the three-level fare structure was docketed for investigation, the innova-
tions proposed by United and American were implemented. These carriers,
together with TWA, form the competition facing Continental along its
Chicago-Los Angeles route."'
In its triple-configured aircraft, Continental's business class felt the
squeeze from United's one-class service; its first-class compartment was
too small to accommodate increased demand stemming from the first-class
fare reduction; its coffee-only economy section was hardly an alternative
for recapturing lost traffic and while profitable, yielded somewhat less pro-
fit per revenue-passenger mile (particularly on non-stop flights) than other
classes. Aside from an investment in new seating configurations, it had
one efficient choice: cancel the business-class tariff and sell the five-abreast
business seats (and a more modest meal) at coach fares. The service had
but minor distinctions from United's one-class service; the coach fare was
substantially lower. Forsaking its historic attitudes, the Board approved.3"
American, TWA, and United had various alternatives to the Continental
move. American, operating several turnaround flights in the Chicago-Los
Angeles market, could, if it chose, maintain dual-configured flights operat-
ed as first/coach or first/economy as it thought best, ignoring seat-pitch
differences between coach and economy. All carriers could operate triple-
configured aircraft, selling "economy" seats as "coach" in other markets.
Other variations on this theme were also possible, any of which might have
been susceptible to the charge of "discrimination" as previously employed
by the Board. No such charge was levied.
In addition, Continental's competitors' transcontinental route structure
made other responses possible, introducing operating changes to avoid di-
version to economy services at Chicago. At the same time, United's one-
class experiment felt additional pressures from the lower first-class fares.
In part, shifting of equipment resources and alteration of the one-class
fare in Continental's markets was an effective response.
However, the combination of first-class and three-class developments
offered United an additional alternative. If one-class services attracted less
volume than expected in certain markets, pooling classes on a single flight
3°'Business & Economy Fares, CAB Docket No. 13939, CAB Order No. E-18759 (31 Aug.
1962) (allowing fares to become effective pending investigation). After a procedural gap of some
thirty-two months, the fares were found to be reasonable, Business & Economy Fares, supra, CAB
Order No. E-22103 (initial decision of the examiner, discussed supra note 75) and No. E-22104
(adopting decision as CAB opinion) (29 April 1965) (discussed supra note 78).
as' United serves all four cities involved (Chicago, Kansas City, Denver and Los Angeles), but
has a closed-door restriction (and does not operate) between Chicago and Kansas City. American
serves neither Kansas City nor Denver. TWA serves all four points although its participation in
Denver traffic is minimal.
a04 Seating Configuration Tariff Proposed by Continental Air Lines, Inc., CAB Docket Nos.
14942, 14943 and 14947, CAB Order No. E-20381 (21 Jan. 1964). Cf. National Airlines Economy
Fares, 30 C.A.B. 1572 (1960) (seating capacities of high density aircraft may vary during low-fare
experiment to avoid modification costs, but only until it is clear that experiment is sound). No
such restrictions were placed on Continental.
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was a reasonable alternative: hence, the introduction of "standard" class.
So configured, the first-standard-coach aircraft could also be used to
provide first-coach-economy service in competing against Continental. Of
course, in order to maintain efficient aircraft utilization, the three-class air-
craft would have to be used in varying markets. Such use introduced
three-class service into new markets, in some instances opposite carriers who
did not serve the Chicago-Los Angeles route and therefore had no sub-
stantial motivation for adopting similar triple configurations.
The significance of these innovations which the Board has allowed into
effect is not confined to the "discrimination" aspects of seating/class/fare
relationships. Even though CAB approval is based on experimentation
rather than on any notion of competitive freedom," s it cannot overlook
the fact that the strategies of Continental and United have not resulted
in automatic emulative responses. In some instances these strategies ap-
parently have benefited the carrier without occasioning any response at
all from its competitors,' casting doubt on the belief that action by one
carrier in its own self-interest will necessarily have an adverse effect on
the industry.
C. Increasing Managerial Alternatives In Operating Authority:
An Area For Future Investigation.
One premise of the theoretical "multi-dimensional" approach discussed
at the outset of this study"° ' is that changes in operating authority should
be viewed as possible efficiency-seeking responses to competition in the
same way as alterations in rate structure. Many of the cases heretofore
discussed, particularly those immediately above, indicate the close relation-
ship between pricing and route structure. If a sound regulatory approach
305 See discussion note 78 supra. There are, of course, limits to "experimentation" as evidenced
by the CAB's refusal to allow trunkline carriers to recoup part of the excess baggage income lost
under liberalized baggage allowances by increasing first-class fares. Domestic Trunkline Carriers,
CAB Docket No. 16363, CAB Order No. E-22483 (27 July 1965). The Board noted that if the
costs of liberalizing the baggage allowance were so significant as to require alteration of the fare
structure, the revision proposed would shift the burden from the one passenger in ten actually
shipping "excess" baggage to all passengers. The identifiability of the passengers using the liberalized
baggage privileges would demand that such costs be assessed against them. Cf. the ratemaking
principle suggested in text accompanying note 216 supra.
The Board's opinion in Domestic Trunkline Carriers is further evidence of the trend noted in
the recent decisions of the Board. Testing the baggage revision proposal on an industrywide basis
would appear to be justifiable in view of the issue under consideration. Since neither baggage carried
nor aircraft space will generally vary from carrier to carrier, costs would best be described by using
an industrywide model. If, notwithstanding the absence of significant costs, the carriers were in
need of additional income, the loss of excess baggage income would in no case provide justification
for the particular revision in rate-relationships proposed, i.e., a first-class increase only.
Had United proposed a 500 first-class fare increase in connection with its proposal to reduce
certain long-haul (over 700 miles) fares (considered and approved in Domestic Trunklines) instead
of tying it to the baggage revision along with other carriers, the healthy earnings position of the
industry would have been of little value as a ground for suspending the increase. Such a proposal
might have been analogized to Eastern's tariff revision (see text accompanying notes 300-01 suPra),
i.e., a revision in rate relationships rather than a direct attempt to increase income. An industrywide
approach to this type of question would not have been justified. It is doubtful, of course, that the
Board actually made such a distinction. Nonetheless, its reliance on general industry conditions as
a decisional ground in this case is a step in the right direction.
' E.g., American has not found that competition requires it to offer three-level fares in the
Houston-Los Angeles market; Northwest continues to operate dual configured aircraft against
United's triple-configured aircraft; aside from Continental's five-abreast coach, no carrier has
copied United's one-class service.
307 See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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to air transportation is found in increasing management's decision-making
latitude in the pricing field to the fullest possible extent, a similar evalua-
tion of the extent to which control over operating authority can be given
over to management would appear to be warranted as a next step.
The relationship between pricing and operating authority is certainly
a two-way street. Just as pricing strategies may precipitate operational
changes or be based on existing operational characteristics, so too, opera-
tional changes may have a direct effect on fares and lead to cost savings
which may have an indirect effect on fares or be an alternative strategy
to be used in place of pricing changes.
A new route authorization or operating pattern may produce a lower
fare per nonstop mile. As Examiner William J. Madden noted in
the Charleston-Columbus Case,"'8 authorizing new service from Detroit,
Toledo, and Columbus direct to Charlotte, N.C., fare reductions might
result from eliminating "the Pittsburgh and Cincinnati doglegs over
which fare 'equalizations' are not now made."3"9 Similarly, in Philadelphia-
Transatlantic Service Case,"'° the examiner argued that Boston had a
greater "claim" to transatlantic service than Philadelphia since, density
aside, Boston passengers would pay higher aggregate fares than New York
passengers although located closer to their ultimate destinations. However,
if one does not put density aside, there is clearly some point at which the
marginal cost of serving Boston on a transatlantic route becomes more than
the profit obtained from serving the thinner market, particularly if loss
of revenue resulting from downgrading a nonstop flight is calculated. At
this point, efficiency may suggest an operating alternative to a fare increase,
the most obvious being to pool traffic at New York, maintaining the same
Boston-Europe fare, but applying it to a back-haul routing.
Assuming all service was in jet aircraft, such a modification would
increase the Boston passenger's travel time, particularly because of the
domestic-international connection at New York. Applied to domestic
travel, in which thinner markets have less jet service, if any, and using
medium-sized cities as the hubs, a system of back-haul rates would appear
to have significant potential. In particular, it might serve as an acceptable
substitute allowing for the elimination of trunkline-local carrier route
competition at smaller cities where trunkline operations have been main-
tained to provide on-line long-haul connections.
For example, United is certificated to serve small communities such as
"o 19 C.A.B. 731 (1955).309 Id. at 754 (examiner's initial decision).
910 15 C.A.B. 148, 169-70 (1952) (examiner's initial decision). The most recent explicit recog-
nition of the relationship between fares and route structure is found in the matter of Ozark Air
Lines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 15697, CAB Order No. E-22465 (22 July 1965), authorizing a
change in Ozark's service pattern to enable it to provide single-plane service between Milwaukee,
Wis., and St. Louis, Mo., with only one intermediate stop. By eliminating the interline connecting
fare, passengers are able to travel between the two cities for $25.75-$3.10 less than the lowest
connecting fare. Moreover, Ozark's service is some 18 minutes faster than the fastest connecting
service, notwithstanding the fact that the latter uses jet coach service from Chicago. Much of the
time savings stems from eliminating Chicago as a necessary junction point for Milwaukee-St. Louis
travel. These facts suggest the importance of further study regarding the effects of linear route




Cedar Rapids from Chicago. Ozark provides similar service, but United's
presence makes nonstop service impossible. The justification for United's
service is to convenience long-haul traffic, but density considerations
prohibit jet service. Thus an on-line connection at the first major hub
(Chicago-eastbound) is required. Des Moines is the nearest medium-sized
community. Its traffic volume supports jet service, but it is insufficient to
make meaningful nonstop service (e.g., without a Chicago east-bound
stop) profitable. In a system of back-haul rates, United would withdraw
from the Chicago-Cedar Rapids market, creating substantial traffic and
revenue benefits for Ozark. 11 Given a coordinated schedule and the
proper rate, long-haul traffic originating at Cedar Rapids would back-
haul on Ozark to Des Moines. By pooling such traffic at Des Moines,
United might be able to overfly Chicago on an eastbound flight. The
carrier could gain from increased stage length; passenger convenience
could be increased; and total elapsed time, even for the back-haul pas-
senger, would be no greater than at present."1'
Changes along these lines and the efficacy of closed-door and long-haul
restrictions are certainly among the subjects which should be considered
in evaluating the extent to which increasing the operating alternatives
open to carrier management might yield beneficial results. In addition,
the effects of linear route descriptions need closer examination.
Of course, the fastest way to increase the operating alternatives open
to a carrier is to free the trunklines from the strictures of their certificates
and throw all city-pair markets open to unrestricted entry by existing
trunklines. As Caves points out:
this change would improve the flexibility of the allocation of transport re-
sources among major markets .... Problems of seasonal imbalance would be
substantially corrected. The rising recognition of mutual interdependence
among the trunks would be set back sharply, unless too many were eliminated
from the business in the process; this seems unlikely . . . all could surely sur-
vive on rationalized systems .... Such a reform would hardly reduce recog-
nized mutual dependence enough to encourage great investment of capital in
new equipment by present trunks; and without this it is difficult to envision
the proliferation of any undesirable forms of competitive conduct."'
Even if the assertion that complete freedom of operating authority
351 The elimination of competitive United service would not only give Ozark new sources of
revenue and reduce its dependence on subsidy, but additionally would benefit beyond-Cedar Rapids
traffic, improving the quality of their service to Chicago. The savings to Ozark would enable it to
participate in a joint backhaul fare with United without appreciable difficulty.
"1' The Cedar Rapids passenger formerly traveled to Chicago in propeller aircraft and incurred
ground time there. The connecting time at Des Moines can be substantially reduced from that re-
quired at the busy Chicago airport. It should also be noted that this principle may be applied in
situations which involve no backhaul. Moreover, elimination of United from the Cedar Rapids
market is not essential to the extent that scheduling permits it to operate its own backhaul service,
the westbound Chicago-Cedar Rapids flight continuing to Des Moines, loading eastbound passengers
at Cedar Rapids for connecting eastbound service at Des Moines.
s" Caves 433. By "mutual dependence," Caves suggests that the tendency to actual competi-
tion is limited by the fact that carriers' route structures presently put them in overall competition
with only one or two carriers in their major markets. The predictability of the competitor's re-
sponse to competition is increased and all are quick to recognize that they are in the classic oligo-
polistic situation in which any competitive strategy will produce unchanged market conditions at
lower revenue. By widening the range of possible alternatives, predictability is lessened.
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would not precipitate undesirable effects is theoretically accurate, one may
justifiably question the practicality of immediate and total implementation
of the policy Caves advances. It may be more desirable to adopt policies
which would encourage each carrier to begin to rationalize its operations
at present levels of investment, analyzing the probable effects and evalu-
ating the actual results on a continuing basis." 4 Unquestionably, sound
public policy suggests that the direction and speed of any such major
innovation be determined by testing the practical results of theoretical
assumptions each step along the way; adjusting the assumptions when
practice shows them to be inaccurate; and solving problems which were
not originally contemplated.31' The maximum possible limits of carrier
freedom in air transportation may be somewhat less than those which
Caves proposes. Nonetheless, we should be committed to probing outward
toward new and far horizons.
The approach suggested herein, while significantly different from past
regulatory history, can be implemented by the CAB without any addi-
tional statutory authority. To some extent, specific decisions evidence a
beginning. It remains, however, to be expanded into a consistent policy
approach. One may conclude that such an approach would be more
closely in line with the CAB's legislative mandate than many previous
policies and decisions of the Board. The declaration in favor of "com-
petition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air transportation system ''... was not intended as an instruction to freeze
regulatory attitudes in the shape required by conditions in 1938, 1948, or
1958. It should be read to mean that the quality as well as the quantity
of competition must necessarily be adjusted in the light of the industry's
growth, its economic characteristics, and technological advances.
"' One possibility here would be to experiment with limited unrestricted entry which did not
involve a significant increase in the carrier's investment, e.g., allowing carriers to enter city-pair
markets in which terminal facilities were already maintained. Capital investment would have to be
regulated in the sense that a "good faith" showing would have to be made, demonstrating the re-
lation of proposed new investment to the carrier's "basic" (i.e., certificated) route structure. If the
pricing latitude were contemporaneously increased (e.g., Caves' 10% above-and-below existing fares
proposal; see text accompanying notes 233-34 supra), carriers would only take advantage of the
operating authority opportunity if it in fact resulted in more efficient operations.
ass Some regulatory problems are apparent from the start. Procedural safeguards would have
to be established to minimize confusion for consumers. The necessary advance notice requirements
for tariff changes already exist, however, some scheme would have to be devised to limit route
modifications to particular times. Under such a system, some problem of "unfair competition"
might also arise, if a carrier instituted a modification and another carrier matched it solely for the
purpose of inducing the first carrier to cancel his proposal (and upon cancellation, the competitor
similarly followed suit). Finally, the CAB would be called upon to develop market-by-market ade-
quacy of service standards on a continuing basis, holding the carriers to minimum standards in
their certificated markets.
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(d), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1964).
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